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This thesis addresses the vital question whether ex ante inflation targeting central 
banks’ forecasts are internally consistent with the undisputable Taylor Principle. Ex ante 
quarterly published monetary policy forecasts for t+1 and t+2 years for the Swedish Riksbank, 
and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand as well as ex ante quarterly published monetary policy 
forecasts for t+1 year for the U.S. Fed are evaluated for the period from Q1/1996 to 
Q2/2017.Various Taylor-type Rule specifications are used for the analysis. Ex ante central 
banks’ forecasts are proven to be consistent with the Taylor Principle pre-financial crisis for 
the ex ante forecast horizon of t+1 year in all cases and for the t+2 year time forecast in the 
case of New Zealand. Post-crisis evidence for monetary policy behavior, consistent with the 
Taylor Principle, can only be provided for the Swedish Riksbank, indicating an extreme shift 
in monetary policy post-financial crisis for the U.S. Fed and the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. Finally, evidence for excessive interest rate smoothing behavior and policy inertia, 
ranging up to 90% as well as evidence for a potential break in real interest equilibrium rates 
post-financial crisis, is provided. 
 
  




Esta tese aborda a questão vital de saber se a inflação antecipada que visa as previsões dos 
bancos centrais é consistente internamente com o Princípio de Taylor. Por conseguinte, as 
previsões de política monetária prévias trimestrais anteriores para t + 1 e t + 2 anos para o 
Riksbank sueco e o Reserve Bank of New Zealand, bem como previsões de política monetária 
publicadas trimestrais ex ante por t + 1 anos para o Fed são avaliadas para o período de tempo 
Q1 / 1996 a Q2 / 2017. Várias especificações da regra de tipo Taylor são usadas para a 
análise. As previsões ex ante dos bancos centrais são consistentes com a crise pré-financeira 
do Princípio Taylor, para um horizonte de previsão ex ante de t + 1 anos em todos os casos e, 
para a previsão t + 2 no caso da Nova Zelândia. Evidências de comportamento da política 
monetária consistentes com o Princípio de Taylor, no período pós crise, só podem ser 
fornecidas para o Riksbank sueco, indicando uma mudança extrema na política monetária pós 
crise financeira para o Fed e o Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Finalmente, são fornecidas 
evidências de excessiva suavização da taxa de juros e de inércia nas políticas, variando até 
90%, bem como evidências de uma ruptura potencial nas taxas de juro reais de equilíbrio pós 
crise financeira.  
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1. Introductory Remarks 
Heraclitus, a Greek philosopher once said, change is the only constant. This infamous quote 
appears to be also true for the evolving responsibility of most central banks around the world. 
While central banks represent an institution that has already been in place since the 
seventeenth century, their general objectives, functions and operations have undoubtedly 
evolved over their prevailing time horizons. An enormous pace of new reforms and newly 
introduced monetary policy approaches have been remarkably visible, especially in recent 
times. Various studies and academic debates have shed some light into the prolonged 
discussions of macroeconomic issues. For instance, the realization of the time inconsistency 
issues and the understanding that monetary policy should largely be concerned with the 
management of private sector expectations as well as various extensions, and analyses of 
monetary policy rules are only a few discoveries that have significantly contributed to the 
rising understanding of macroeconomic policy effects.1 In recent years, numerous centrals 
bank around the world have instituted explicit inflation targeting as their primary monetary 
policy strategy. One aspect, which corresponds to the increasing number of inflation targeting 
policy regimes is the generally rising level of transparency pursued by most policymakers. 
While for most of their existing time central banks have followed the conventional wisdom 
that “silence is golden”, a recent consensus has emerged that central banks should operate 
under more transparent frameworks. Hence, several central banks have started to publish the 
so-called monetary policy reports, explaining and justifying their monetary policy decisions. 
Moreover, as monetary policy decisions affect the economy with significant time lags, 
optimal monetary policy should hypothetically be proactive. Thus, monetary authorities 
should set their instrument in advanced and in accordance with their best judgement about 
future economic developments. The published economic forecast in the monetary policy 
reports should then represent the estimated path of economic variables based on current 
interest rate settings and policymakers judgement about the future state of the economy.  
However, with the start of the financial crisis and the vicinity of the zero lower bound 
in most policy jurisdictions, economic assumptions which were taken for granted have altered 
dramatically. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that under this problematic economic 
condition, monetary authorities respond identically to changes in inflation and output as when 
nominal interest rates were significantly above the lower bound. Therefore, it is of utmost 
                                                 
1 Mishkin (2004). p. 48 
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interest to analyze if monetary policy forecasts, published by inflation targeting central banks, 
are still generally consistent with the undisputed importance of the so-called Taylor Principle. 
The Taylor Principle states that central banks have to increase real interest rate in order to 
reduce inflationary pressure and vice versa. 
In order to answer this question, the thesis provides a detailed overview over recent 
monetary policy research and is structured as follows: The literature review section lays the 
foundation for the corresponding research area, which later analyses the internal consistency 
of inflation targeting central banks forecasts, with the well-known Taylor principle. For this 
purpose, a comprehensive overview over theoretical models and practical policy 
implementation approaches will be provided. As the macroeconomic discussions involved are 
highly complex, partly controversial and dependent on numerous theories, the corresponding 
theoretical sections have to cover a wide range of different areas. Thus, before immersing 
into the field of Taylor-type Rules, Principles and inflation targeting, a theoretical foundation 
over the most important monetary policy transmission channels, over the choice of the 
monetary instrument as well as over the historical rule vs. discretion debate, will be provided. 
After elaborating the more general framework overview, this paper will immerse into recent 
discussions about policy rule implementations, before deriving the well-known Taylor Rule. 
Based on Clarida, Gali and Gertler the most common Taylor-type Rule morphology 
implementations will be reviewed. Lastly, the theoretical section will explore the conceptual 
characteristics of inflation targeting as well as optimal monetary policy, conducted under 
inflation targeting. 
Section 3. discusses and presents a quantitative analyses, which examines the question 
whether inflation targeting central banks’ forecasts are internally consistent with the Taylor 
Principle. For this purpose, the interest rate setting behavior of the Swedish Riksbank, the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank will be examined by 
various Taylor-type Rule specifications for the one and two years forecast horizon. In detail, 
the data used for the empirical analysis is derived from the quarterly monetary policy reports 
of the respective central banks. Following the quantitative assessment, qualitative 
interpretations and research limitations will be discussed before ending the thesis with 
concluding remarks.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1.   A General Framework Overview of Monetary Policy 
Before analyzing and evaluating optimal monetary policy frameworks, it is crucial to 
understand how and to what extent monetary policy decisions are generally transferred into 
the real economy, a question that lies at the core of macroeconomics. Therefore, it is essential 
to not only analyze the main monetary policy transmission channels and the question of the 
right monetary policy instrument, but also to discuss the degree of overall autonomy that 
should be granted to monetary authorities. Thus, this chapter will provide a short overview of 
important research in the field of monetary policy transmissions, of the instrument problem 
and of the traditional rule versus discretion debate, before immersing into the field of Taylor-
type Rules and Principles and inflation targeting.  
Despite extensive research in the field of monetary transmission channels, many 
views on the monetary transmission mechanisms in an open economy differ with regards to 
the emphasis they place on money, credit, long-term interest rates, exchange rates, asset 
prices and the role of financial institutions.2 However, as any extensive analysis of monetary 
policy transmission channels and monetary policy instruments would go beyond the coverage 
of this thesis, only a rough overview will be provided here. For a more detailed description of 
the main monetary policy transmission channels, please refer to Appendix I. 
Traditionally, macroeconomic research of monetary transmission mechanisms, the 
process through which monetary policy decisions impact the real economy, has primarily 
focused on aggregate demand channels and expectation channels.3 More precisely, it 
analyzed how unexpected policy-induced variations in the nominal money stock (the sum of 
currency in circulation and bank reserves held by the corresponding central bank) or the 
short-term nominal interest rate impact real economic variables, such as aggregate output, 
employment and inflation, by mainly affecting neoclassical transmission channels, such as 
investment and consumption of both firms and private households’ normally with a time lag.4 
Hence, according to the traditional Keynesian view, a contractionary monetary policy- (𝑀 ↓) 
induced increase in short-term nominal interest rates (𝑖 ↑) leads to a decrease in aggregate 
                                                 
2 Taylor (1995). p. 11 
3 Cecchetti (1994). p. 1 
4 Ireland (2005). p. 3 
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demand and total output (𝑌 ↓) by increasing financing costs, thereby lowering total 
investment spending (𝐼 ↓) of both firms and private households.5 
 
𝑀 ↓ (↑)  → 𝑖 ↑ (↓) → 𝐼 ↓ (↑) → 𝑌 ↓ (↑)        (1) 
 
Additionally, monetary authorities are capable of affecting inflation expectations of 
private agents, which amongst other, impacts inflation with a time lag via wage and price 
setting behavior.6 The crucial role of private agent expectations for monetary policy decisions 
will be further elaborated and analyzed in section 2.2. during the Rule vs. Discretion debate. 
In open economies with flexible exchange rates, policy-induced changes in short-term 
nominal interest rates additionally affect real economic variables through the exchange rate 
channel. The transmission can be explained by the effects of interest parity in combination 
with price rigidity. If the domestic nominal interest rate exceeds the level of its foreign 
counterpart, domestic monetary deposits become more valuable relative to other currency 
deposits. Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, this leads to an increase in 
demand and, hence, to a corresponding currency appreciation.7 Simultaneously, as both 
prices and wage contracts are assumed to be sticky, the currency appreciation directly 
impacts the trade balance of an economy and thus affects total output, until the exchange rate 
returns to its previous real base line path.8 
Furthermore, non-neoclassical transmission channels, such as the balance sheet and 
lending channels, amplify the magnitude of monetary policy decisions. Those effects 
primarily arise due to private market imperfections or government interferences in credit 
markets.9 However, as the exact magnitude, time effect and interconnectivity of monetary 
policy effects are uncertain, it is hardly possible for monetary authorities to predict the 
precise effects of any transmission channels on the economy and general price levels, 
impeding the analysis of monetary policy.10  
 
                                                 
5 Mishkin (1995). p. 4 – The essence of Keynesian neoclassical transmission channels can be captured by the  
user-cost of capital theory, Tobin’s q theory and the lifecycle hypothesis of consumption, which are further 
elaborated in Appendix I. 
6 Svensson (1998). p. 611  
7 Mishkin (1995). p. 5 
8 Taylor (1995). p. 17 – Normally the effect of the direct exchange rate channel is assumed to be shorter than the 
effect of the aggregate demand channel. 
9 Boivin Kiley and Mishkin (2010), p. 15 
10 Ireland (2005). p. 6 
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2.1.1. Monetary Policy Instruments and the Instrument Problem 
Not only the transmission of monetary policies has been historically hotly debated, 
but also the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments, giving rise to the so-called 
“instrument problem” (also known as the “target problem”). According to the instrument 
problem, monetary authorities can either operate through changes in short-term nominal 
interest rates or through changes in the nominal money stock to pursue their defined 
objectives, but not use both instruments simultaneously and independently.11 As soon as one 
operating instrument is determined, the other one cannot be controlled precisely.12 
Conceptually, the two instruments are very similar. Given the demand for money schedule in 
the money market, controlling the price, which is basically determined by the interest rate 
instrument, is equivalent to controlling the quantity, which can be varied by the quantity of 
money instrument. Nevertheless, in practice some differences occur, giving rise to a 
voluminous amount of literature, which discusses the merits of each instrument.13 Again, as a 
detailed review of this discussion would exceed the main focus of this thesis, only a brief 
overview will be provided. 
In essence, monetarists and other advocates of monetary base based policy 
instruments mainly supported the view of Milton Friedman, who argued that “Inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced 
only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.”14 In order to fully 
understand the monetarism view and its implications, firstly the general accounting equation 
of the quantity theory of money hypothesis (QTM), which proposes that the general price 
level in an economy is directly proportional to the money supply, has to be revised. The QTM 
hypothesis states that a given change in the quantity of money will result in an equal change 
in price inflation and nominal interest rates.15 As the QTM should be seen as an accounting 
identity, it should theoretically always hold. In detail, the corresponding, simplified quantity 
equation of money is defined as:  
 
𝑀 ∗ 𝑉 = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑌             (2) 
 
                                                 
11 Poole (1970). p. 107 
12 Hooper, Catherine and Mann (1993). p. 5 
13 Carlstrom, Fürst (1995). p. 247 
14 See Friedman (1970). p. 4 
15 Lucas (1980). p. 1 




M  is the money supply,  
V  is the velocity of money circulation,  
P  is the general price level of an economy,  
Y  is the real output of an economy.16  
 
The QTM implies a hypothesis on the behavior of economic variables. Assuming that 
real economic output and quantity of money are exogenously determined and that the 
velocity of money has a constant long run equilibrium, price levels would be strictly 
proportional to the quantity of money.17 Furthermore, Friedman`s revision of the QTM 
suggests that the money demand function is not only highly stable, but also insensitive to 
changes in interest rates, as opposed to the Keynesian liquidity preference theory. In light of 
this hypothesis, Friedman argued that real permanent income is the only determinant of real 





=  ∅(𝑌𝑝)           (3) 
 
where  
𝑀𝑑  represents the money demand, 
 P represents the general price level of an economy,  
 ∅(𝑌𝑝) represents a function of permanent real income. 18 
 
By combining equation (2) and (3) and assuming money demand and money supply 
are in equilibrium, 𝑀 = 𝑀𝑑 = 𝑀𝑠, the QTM can be converted into the following velocity 
equation: 
 






          (4) 
                                                 
16 Darity (2008). p. 659 
17 Serletis (2007). p. 91 
18 Serletis (2007). p. 98 – John Maynard Keynes’ liquidity preference theory states that the demand for money 
as an asset depends on the interest foregone by not holding long term financial assets. Interest rates can 
therefore, be seen as a reward for the abnegation of liquidity and are assumed to directly impact the general 
demand for money within an economy. 
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This equation implies that even though the velocity might not be stable, it still is 
predictable, resulting in the conclusion that aggregate spending and therefore total output are 
mainly determined by the quantity of money.19 
Additionally, even though monetarists acknowledge the theory of monetary neutrality 
in the long run, they argue that unexpected policy-induced changes in the monetary base will 
still lead to movements in real economic variables in the short run due to temporary wage and 
price rigidities. This implies that changes in the quantity of money are normally only neutral 
in the long run, however are non-neutral in the short run.20 The observed relationship between 
the quantity of money and prices lead to the conclusion that inflation is a phenomenon caused 
by excessive, monetary over-expansion. Thus, it should be preventable by a proper 
management of the money supply instrument.21 In order to promote the goal of economic and 
price stability, many advocates of monetarism argue that authorities should mainly focus on a 
moderate, steady growth in the quantity of nominal money stock, as proposed by Friedman.22  
In comparison, the general concept of an interest rate policy instrument was 
popularized by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell’s “natural rate” hypothesis. According 
to the natural rate hypothesis, there exists a natural interest rate compatible with generally 
stable price levels. An increase in the natural rate should therefore lead to a contractionary 
economic activity and vice versa. Thus, price and economic stability should potentially be 
obtained if an equality of the natural rate and the market interest rate could be achieved.23 In 
later economic research, the natural rate hypothesis was used to connect the general price 
level to money and credit by economist Maynard Keynes.24 
In contrast to pure monetarists, advocates in favor of interest rate policy instruments 
argue, based on the natural rate hypothesis, that the quantity of money could only indirectly 
affect the real economy through variations in interest rates.25 With regards to this view, it 
may seem paradoxical that money supply itself only plays a residual role in monetary policy 
                                                 
19 Serletis (2007). p. 100 
20 Ireland (2005). p. 3 – The theory of monetary neutrality states that changes in the nominal money base only 
affect nominal variables and have no impact on real economic variables. 
21 Cagan (1995). p. 196 
22 Friedman (1968). p. 17 – Friedman’s constant money growth rule (k-percent rule) proposes that money supply 
should increase by a constant rate, irrespectively of business cycles, thereby eliminating any leeway for 
monetary authorities. Friedman promoted the view that granting central banks any flexibility about the nominal 
monetary base could have severe economic consequences, due to the tendency to pursue short-term goals. 
23 Wicksell (2012). p. 212 
24 Keynes (1930). p. 7 
25 Darity (2008). p. 660 
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decisions.26 Money demand appears to be endogenous rather than exogenous and therefore, 
the quantity of money within an economy is demand rather than supply driven.27 
Theoretically, central banks only need to supply exactly the quantity of money that is 
demanded at the preferred interest rate level.28 Furthermore, it is argued that velocity is 
potentially unstable and unpredictable. Consequently, rapid changes in money supply could 
be (partially) absorbed by changes in the velocity of money, neglecting its effect on both 
output and price levels.29 The observed effect of monetary policies, which are based on 
changes in the nominal monetary base and economic variables, must therefore take place 
because of the corresponding variations in interest rates.30  
Empirical findings of Pool, Carlstrom and Fuerst and Taylor partly advocate the use 
of interest rates as the primary monetary policy instrument. In short, Pool argued that both 
instruments have some merit. In an environment with various money demand shocks, the 
interest rate instrument is superior in decreasing the variability of output, as the goods market 
is more or less insulated from the shocks, whereas for some other shocks the quantity of 
money instrument appears to be superior.31 Moreover, Carlstrom and Fuerst advocate interest 
rate rather than money growth rules due to their positive impact on households’ expected 
lifetime utility and higher levels of flexibility in response to economic shocks. They argue 
that in a portfolio-rigid economy, which follows a money growth rule, private agents’ 
investment decisions are partly deteriorated. Technological innovations and government 
spending tend to result in large fluctuations in the nominal interest rate under monetary 
growth rules. Hence, labor input responds only with a considerable time lag. However, by 
using an interest rate rule and therefore short-term interest rates as the main policy 
instrument, Carlstrom and Fuerst pointed out that both distortions could potentially be 
eliminated. Hence, households’ investment decisions respond more efficiently to the 
proposed shocks.32 Furthermore, Taylor also argued, in accordance with the stochastic 
monetary policy rule simulations of Bryan et. al in 1993, that the interest rate instrument 
                                                 
26 Svensson (1999). p. 610 
27 Hannsgen (2004). p. 1 
28 Svensson (1999). p. 610 
29 Darity (2008). p. 659 – This concern is also commonly referred to as the “velocity-instability” problem. 
30 Hannsgen (2004), p. 1 
31 Pool (1970). p. 204 
32 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995). p. 266 
   - 9 - 
 
 
performs substantially better than a money supply instrument in reducing variability in output 
and inflation under various shocks.33 
The implications by Pool, Carlstrom and Fuerst and Taylor are partly consistent with 
the “new consensus macroeconomics”, which state that exogenous demand for money is 
normally highly unstable and that a monetary policy only based on the nominal money base 
could result in high fluctuations in interest rates, leading to even greater economic 
instability.34 Nevertheless, the reality is more complicated and monetary policy decisions 
comprise a high degree of uncertainty. Due to the short-term non-neutrality of the quantity of 
money on general price levels, both instruments have some merit, each of them stressing one 
side of a highly complex reality.35 In order to simplify the empirical analysis ahead and to 
stay focused on Taylor’s initially introduced interest-rate rule, the following parts will 
primarily consider the short-term interest rate as central banks main monetary policy 
instrument, at least during conventional times. 
 
2.1.2. Discretionary Judgment versus Monetary Policy Rules – A Dichotomy Debate 
After determining the rough, theoretical mechanics of how central banks can broadly 
transfer their policy objectives into the economy through monetary policy instruments, the 
question remains how and to what extent they should use those instruments. Should central 
banks under optimal monetary policy operate under the concept of full discretionary or 
follow a framework that is based on predetermined, publicly promulgated rules - a dichotomy 
debate, which has concerned economists for almost a century.36  
Under the concept of discretionary monetary policy, authorities are free to act in 
accordance with their own judgement to achieve desired outcomes and do not need to make 
consistent commitments about future money and prices. In this context, economic policies are 
generally more based on ad hoc judgements rather than on a following specific framework. 
                                                 
33 Taylor (2010). p. 9 
34 Brandl (2016). p. 203 
35 Setterfield (2013). p. 2 – During periods of extreme economic shocks, traditional monetary policy instruments 
may lose their usefulness of translating monetary policy objectives into the economy. Unconventional measures, 
such as QE, may then be used as a recovery tool and to avoid so-called liquidity traps. This phenomenon 
becomes especially visible during times, when the interest rate instrument hit the zero lower bound. Historically, 
it was believed that during this time, the interest rate instrument would lose its power, whereas the quantity of 
money instrument is still operative, indicating an asymmetry in the implementation possibilities of the main 
monetary policy instruments. (The subject will be further elaborated in Section 2.2.2. The Taylor Principle in 
prospect of the Zero-lower Bound.) 
36 Fischer (1988). p. 1 
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On the contrary, the concept of rule-based monetary policies imposes certain restrictions on 
the discretion of policy makers. Those restrictions could either directly or indirectly limit the 
actions of policy makers by imposing certain requirements and targets that central banks must 
follow and achieve. Hence, contrary to discretional frameworks, rule based frameworks 
impose some degree of required commitment for certain observable economic variables. For 
instance, simple monetary policy rules could impose either a constant monetary base, thereby 
limiting the discretion of varying it, or the need for publicly announcing monetary growth 
targets over some predefined period and therefore, limiting the objectives pursued by 
monetary authorities.37  
Historically, many economists have shown great interest in monetary policy rule 
based frameworks, ranging from Adam Smiths, who argued that “a well-regulated paper-
money” could lead to significant improvements of economic stability, to Knut Wicksell who 
advocated the importance of monetary rules to avoid monetary excess and corresponding 
hyperinflation.38 This view was further promoted by Friedman, who empirically analyzed 
monetary policy behavior of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank (FED) between its founding date 
and the beginning of the 1970s. Friedman argued that the discretion of monetary policy 
authorities was severely deficient and had led to great economic instability in the past.39 
Finally, modern policy rules, such as the Taylor rule, were designed to put an end to this 
observed economic instability.40  
In essence, the traditional argumentation of economist who were in favor of rule-based 
monetary policies pointed out that monetary authorities are normally under great political 
pressure. Thus, policymakers’ propensities might be guided by special, self-serving 
interests.41 A rule based policy, however, would not only enable them to withstand political 
pressure but also provide some objective criteria for critically analyzing and evaluating their 
performance. Additionally, such a policy framework would enhance certainty about policy 
developments for private agents.42 
On the other hand, other infamous economists, for instance Modigliani, have 
traditionally argued that discretionary monetary policy conducted by rational expert monetary 
                                                 
37 Dwyer Jr. (1993). p. 4 
38 Adam Smith (1811). p.151; Wicksell (2012). p. 210 
39 Taylor (2012). p. 1017 
40 Taylor (2010). p. 2 – The Taylor rule will be discussed in more details in section 2.2. 
41 Barro (1984). p. 4 
42 Fischer (1988). p. 11 
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authorities would significantly enhance economic performance and stability.43 Moreover, 
while most advocates of discretionary policy regimes acknowledge that insulating monetary 
authorities from political pressure might result in some benefits, they indicate that the other 
two arguments, namely performance evaluation and economic policy certainty, are rather 
unpersuasive. Evaluating central banks performances based on rules and exercises, which are 
irrelevant to the dynamically changing behavior of macroeconomic variables, provides no 
real economic benefit. In these situations, rules would merely impede central banks to deal 
with arising problems in an optimal way and, therefore, do more harm than good.44 By 
following a discretionary policy, however, authorities could act in accordance with their own 
judgement and produce the same outcome as a rule-based policy would, if this were indeed 
the optimal behavior. Moreover, if deviations from the policy would result in a superior 
outcome, monetary authorities would be free to pursue them instead.45 In addition, advocates 
of discretionary policy stated that certainty about policy development is not a compelling 
argument either. Putting financial institutions aside, private agents want primarily certainty 
about prices and economic output rather than about policy instrument developments. It was 
argued that if a discretionary policy, which is based on unpredictable patterns, results in price 
stability and full employment, the monetary policy itself would then be of no account. Hence, 
the traditional consensus was that discretionary monetary policy pursued by monetary experts 
could accomplish anything a rule based policy could, without tying up their hands when 
deviations are necessary.46 Discretion appeared to be interchangeable with flexibility and was 
seen as superior in comparison with a static rule-based policy framework. 
Nevertheless, this perspective of the dichotomy debate was suddenly changed by 
Kydland and Prescott in 1977 due to their analysis of the possible time inconsistency of 
optimal plans. In short, by looking at policy rules as some forms of contractual future 
commitments, enforceable rules can decrease the average rate of inflation while producing 
the exact same amount of unanticipated inflationary shocks, namely zero.47 It is argued that 
under the assumption of rational agents, no beneficial, unanticipated inflationary shocks ex 
post are feasible. Individuals understand the incentives of central banks to deviate from 
announced polices and already formulate their expectations accordingly. As monetary 
                                                 
43 Dwyer Jr. (1993). p. 3 
44 Fischer (1988). p. 12 
45 Dwyer Jr (1993). p. 12 
46 Fischer (1988). p. 12 
47 Barro (1984). p. 1 
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authorities under discretionary policy seem to have no mechanism that indicates real 
commitment to the previously announced policy, both inflation and inflation expectations are 
doomed to rise.48 By relying on enforced policy rules, however, overall economic 
performances can be significantly enhanced as it eliminates agents’ expectations of inflation 
surprises. Consequently, the time inconsistency issue of discretionary monetary policy 
provides a strong argument in favor of rule based framework as it, as opposed to Friedman`s 
less persuasive, traditional argumentations, points out the importance of the timing and 
magnitude of monetary policy actions.49 
 
2.1.2.1.   A Revision of the Dynamic Inconsistency Issue  
Due to the importance of the time inconsistency issue in the forming of modern 
monetary policy, a more precise revision will follow in this sub-section. 
The dynamic inconsistency issue of monetary policy is based on the paradoxical premise that 
discretionary policy, which follows a selection of actions that are optimal at each point in 
time, taking into consideration current and end-of period situations, will not result in a 
maximization of a previous agreed on, optimal social objective function. This paradoxical 
premise even holds under the assumption that policymakers know the exact timing and 
magnitude of their policy actions. Therefore, it is shown that as soon as expectations of 
agents are assumed to be rational, previously used control theory is not an appropriate tool for 
economic planning anymore.50 
In simpler terms, dynamic inconsistency in the context of monetary policy refers to 
the phenomenon that future optimal macroeconomic policy decisions, which are formulated 
and announced at an initial point in time, are no longer optimal at a later stage, without any 
new information arising in the meantime. Under the assumption of potential welfare 
maximization, central banks adopting discretionary policies are expected to always follow 
short-run optimal decisions and therefore deviate later from initially formulated optimal 
policy plans, whenever possible, to gain the economic benefits of unanticipated inflationary 
shocks.51 However, as rational agents realize that the initially announced policy does not 
appear to be credible anymore, those deviations will already be anticipated and incorporated 
                                                 
48 Barro (1986). p. 25 
49 Kydland and Prescott (1977). p. 474-475 
50 Kydland and Prescott (1977). p. 473 
51 Fischer (1988). p. 23 
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into agents’ expectations to eliminate a consistent pattern of surprises. Consequently, the new 
equilibrium outcome of inflation increases to a level where the incentives for monetary 
authorities to create inflationary shocks are fully offset by their corresponding costs.52 It 
follows that not only potential benefits from surprise inflations are eliminated and that central 
banks gain no significant benefit from their opportunism but also that on average 
discretionary policy produces a worse outcome than a rule based policy, due to its time 
inconsistency.53 A credible, enforced rule based framework, however, is time consistent if 
some mechanics prevent ex post violations of initially announced policies. Thus, credible 
rule-based policies tend to lower the equilibrium rates of inflation and monetary growth, 
while holding unemployment at equal, natural levels.54  
A simplified mathematical way to look at the time inconsistency issue can be 
provided by analyzing a linear form of an augmented Phillips curve function that is used by 
economists to rationalize the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼(𝜋𝑡
∗ − 𝜋𝑡) +  𝑢
∗         (5) 
 
where   
𝑢𝑡 is the unemployment rate in period t, 
𝛼 is a positive constant,  
𝜋𝑡
∗ is the expected inflation rate at time t,  
𝜋𝑡 is the actual inflation rate at time t, 
𝑢∗ is the natural unemployment rate in absence of any monetary disturbances.  
 
According to this simplified formula, central banks have an incentive to create 
unanticipated inflationary shocks (𝜋𝑡∗ < 𝜋𝑡) by deviating from their announced policy to 
stimulate the economy and maximize an agreed on, optimal social objective function, 
 
𝑆(𝜋𝑡, 𝑢𝑡),           (6) 
 
that is dependent on both inflation and unemployment rates at time t.55  
                                                 
52 Kydland and Prescott (1977). p. 479 
53 Taylor (1983). p. 1 
54 Barro and Gordon (1983). p. 101 
55 Kydland and Prescott (1977). p. 479 
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However, private agents understand that discretionary policymakers do not need to 
commit to future money and prices, but rather have the discretion to maximize social welfare 
at each period individually, namely by creating unanticipated inflationary shocks. Therefore, 
rational agents form their expectations accordingly, which implies in mathematical terms that 
expectation of inflation is equal to the expected rate of inflation: 
 
𝜋𝑡
∗ = 𝐸(𝜋𝑡).           (7) 
 
The expected rate of inflation will then be in an equilibrium, at a level where the 
marginal cost of inflation surprises equals its marginal benefit. By following a discretionary 
monetary policy, an economy bears the cost of high inflation to offset high, rational inflation 
expectations without being granted any benefits resulting from unanticipated inflationary 
shocks (lower short-term unemployment rate). In contrast, a credible, enforced rule that 
prohibits ex post policy violations will eliminate the rise in inflation expectations as no 
inflation surprises are anticipated by private agents. Thus, it provides the same economic 
outcome with lower levels of imposed inflation costs for the economy.56  
Figure 1 illustrates some Phillips curves and indifference curves for both discretionary 
and rule-based monetary policies. According to equation (5), the simplified Phillips curves 
are linear with corresponding slopes of −𝛼−1 and intersecting the x-axis at 𝜋𝑡∗. To be at a 
consistent equilibrium, the indifference curve needs to be tangent to the Phillips curves 
somewhere along the vertical axis. Only in these cases are agents’ expectations rational and 
the chosen policy is the best, given the situation at hand. Furthermore, πt⋯ − πt can be 
interpreted as the deviation of inflation from its desired, optimal rate. 
Obviously, the outcome under discretionary policy is inferior to that under credible 
rule-based policy if monetary authorities desire price stability. Both policies deliver the same 
unemployment rate while deviating vastly different from optimal, desired inflation rates.57 
The superiority of rule-based monetary policies, postulated by the dynamic inconsistency 
issue, in comparison with discretionary monetary policies in terms of price stability is further 
supported by the empirical findings of Taylor. Taylor continued Friedman’s observational 
work and analyzed more recent periods. According to Taylor, both a more rule-based era as 
well as a more discretionary policy era could be observed in the U.S. over the last three 
                                                 
56 Barro (1986). p. 25-27 
57 Kydland and Prescott (1977). p. 479-480 
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decades. However, their economic performances were remarkably different. Whereas the 
rule-based era from 1985 until 2003 saw only a few mild recessions with decades of great 
economic expansion, the discretionary ad hoc period from 2003 onwards has been subject to 
large volatility in economic performance, ranging from devastating boom and burst periods in 
housing markets to a great recession with an anemic recovery. Taylor concludes that a key 
driver of the significant performance differences lies within the different monetary policy 
regimes and therefore postulates the importance to preserve the concept of more rule-based 





Figure 1: Equilibrium inflation rates for discretionary and rule-based monetary policies. 
Based on Kydland and Prescott (1977). p. 479  
 
                                                 
58 Taylor (2012). p. 14 
𝛑𝐭
⋯ − 𝛑𝐭 
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2.1.3. Following the Traces of Modern Monetary Policy Rules  
Even though the time inconsistency issue advocates a strong case towards enforceable 
rule-based monetary policies, it does not provide evidence for the structure of a concrete, 
simple monetary policy rule. Therefore, there are numerous and controversial discussions 
concerning the vital question if one regime approach is superior to others with regards to 
some objective criteria, such as the variability of inflation and output.59 
However, when evaluating monetary policies based on some advocated monetary 
policy rules, it is essential to distinguish among instrument variations because of suggested 
changes of the monetary policy rules and variations due to movements along the policy.60 To 
avoid any confusion, it is explicitly stated that this section will shortly compare the findings 
of alternative policy regime structures with a clear focus entirely on interest rate rules, in 
which short-term interest rates will respond in accordance to changes in some economic 
variables. This policy rule constraint is based on the previously discussed instrument choice 
in section 2.1.61 
As it is vital for central banks and governmental institutions to know the stabilization 
properties and performances of different monetary policy regimes, various rules have been 
subject to a vast amount of academic and institutional research.62 Bryant, Hooper and Mann, 
for example, analyzed and compared the performance of nine different feedback interest rate 
policy rules for open economies, which were developed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Federal Reserve Board, the Department of Finance in Canada, and various other 
individual researchers. Within all evaluated models, monetary authorities were expected to 
proportionally adjust their interest rate settings from some baseline path in response to 
deviations of variables from some predefined, optimal target. 
 
𝑖 − 𝑖∗ = 𝛽(𝑧 − 𝑧∗)          (8) 
 
 
                                                 
59 Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993). p. 3 
60 Taylor (1999). p. 320 
61 Nevertheless, according to Taylor (1993) even central banks, which primarily use some interest rate rules as 
guidance should keep close track of the money supply. Taylor (1993) argues that if inflation reaches 
unconventional levels, either very high or negative, inflation expectation become very volatile. This among 
others, reduces the usefulness of interest rate rules and eliminates their advantages over money supply rules, 
which are still operative in this case. 
62 Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993). p. 3 
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where   
i represents the short-term nominal interest rate, 
  𝑖∗ represents some baseline path, 
  z represents a target variable, 
  𝑧∗ represents a predefined optimal target for the variable under analysis. 
  𝛽 represents the magnitude of the corresponding policy response. 
 
Variables under analysis were, for example, the general price level, the money supply, 
the exchange rate, the nominal income or the real output. Even though, there were 
considerable differences in the structure and design of the models under analysis, there was 
no real consensus on a particular optimal monetary policy rule under various shocks. 
However, their findings indicated that policy rules, which were based on the exchange rate or 
money supply, were in general inferior to models that focused directly on general price levels 
and real output. In other words, monetary policy rules that increased the short-term interest 
rate instrument in times when the price level and real income were above their targets, and 
vice versa, seemed to work considerably well. The findings of Bryant, Hooper and Mann are 
generally consistent with the research findings of the multicounty monetary policy models 
published by Taylor in 1993. According to Taylor, formulating a monetary policy rule that 
places some positive weight on real output, in addition to a positive weight on price levels, is 
in general superior to only a simple price or output rule. Therefore, Bryant, Hooper and Mann 
and Taylor came to the same conclusion that a good interest rate monetary policy rule should 
clearly react to both, deviations of price levels from some optimal target as well as deviations 
of real output from some desired target.63 The results were also nearly simultaneously 
confirmed by Henderson and McKibben, who also argued for a policy rule that incorporated 
both price and output deviations from some optimal targets.64 Those important findings have 
later become the empirical foundation of the infamous, classic Taylor Rule. 
  
                                                 
63 Taylor (1992). p. 10-13 
64 Henderson and McKibbin (1993). p. 310 
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2.2.   The Classic Taylor Rule  
Based on the previously explained empirical evidence that captured the essence of the 
behavior of the Fed fairly well, Taylor developed a simple but elegant monetary reaction 
function. In his own words, the policy rule is “simple enough to put on the back of a business 
card”, while still fitting historical monetary policy decisions of the Fed remarkably well.65 
According to this simple monetary reaction function, the Fed determines the nominal short-
term interest rate based on an equilibrium rate from which it deviates whenever inflation 
and/or output does not correspond to their desired target levels. Thus, to reduce inflationary 
pressure, resulting from either too high inflation or output above its full-employment level, 
the rule recommends a “tight” monetary policy with high interest rates, and vice versa. 
This parameterization not only seemed to fit the Fed policy behavior surprisingly well 
in a period in which monetary policy was judged to have been widely successful, but also 
described policy decisions directly in terms of the developments of their two major 
operational objectives, namely price stability and economy growth. Taylor noted that such a 
policy rule could provide some clear guidelines for future policy decisions. Thus, it could be 
adopted as a general principle of behavior.66 However, Taylor also pointed out that generally 
a model-based approach could not be the only incentive for making policy decisions, as no 
single simplified economic theory provides a clear and reliable picture of the future.67 The 
incorporation of some degree of systematic freedom, which does not deteriorate central 
banks’ credibility and accountability, into the adaptation and interpretation of the proposed 
rule is therefore commonly referred to as the broad interpretation of the Taylor Rule and 
represents an important milestone in the history of the empirical evaluation of monetary 
policies.68 The so-called Taylor Rule is thus, an approximation of the responsiveness of 
nominal interest rates to changes in economic conditions and can be described as: 
 
it= r
*+ πt+ βπ* ( πt- π
* )+βγ* (yt-y
*)+εt





                                                 
65 Orphanides (2003). p. 984 
66 Taylor (1993). p. 15 
67 Taylor (1999). p. 320 
68 Orphanides (2003). p. 991 
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  𝑖𝑡 is the short-term nominal interest rate at time t, 
  𝑟∗is the constant equilibrium real interest rate consistent with full  
employment, 
  𝜋𝑡 is the average inflation rate over the previous four quarters at time t, 
  𝜋∗is the desired rate of inflation, 
  𝛾𝑡 is the (logarithm of) real output at time t, 
  𝑦∗ is the (logarithm of) potential output, 
𝛽𝜋 and 𝛽𝛾 are positive coefficients. 
 
Although there was no real consensus about the exact size of the coefficients, Taylor 
initially proposed settings of 0.5 for both as well as a 2% constant equilibrium real interest 
rate and a 2% inflation target for the U.S.69  
Two important propositions arise from the rule above. First, a positive, non-zero 
coefficient for 𝛽𝜋 implies that central banks tend to adjust their interest rate policy instrument 
disproportionally to increases in inflation. This important proposition, that central banks can 
potentially stabilize the economy by changing nominal interest rates by more than one for one 
with inflation and thereby affecting real interest rates, became generally known as the Taylor 
Principle and is an implied prerequisite to foster economic stability in modern 
macroeconomics.70 Hence, the majority of macroeconomic models require this condition to 
hold for a unique, stable equilibrium to exist.71 The intuition behind the Taylor Principle is 
that monetary authorities must increase real interest rates to affect the real economy and to 
relieve the inflationary pressure. Secondly, the rule implies that such monetary policy “leans 
against the wind”. By changing the short-term nominal interest rate instrument when there is 
a difference between real and potential output, monetary authorities are capable of pushing 
the economy back to the desired real output and inflation target levels.72 
                                                 
69 Taylor (1993). p. 13-14 – The initially proposed settings were not determined by econometrical analysis but 
rather represent an educated guess that seemed to fit the behavior of the FED and the spirit of recent research 
remarkably well. 
70 Davig and Leeper (2007). p. 607 – The Taylor rule is sometimes denoted as it= r*+βπ*(πt- π
*)+βγ*(yt-y
*)+εti. 
In this case the Taylor Principle would require βπ > 1 in order to change nominal interest rates by more than one 
for one with inflation. 
71 Woodford (2001), p. 232 
72 Taylor (2010), p. 10 – The difference between realized and potential output is widely referred to as the so-
called output gap. 
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2.2.1. The Taylor Principle and Macroeconomic Stability 
The Taylor Principle, derived from the Taylor Rule, is a relatively simple idea, which 
has become one of the most vital monetary policy implications to promote economic stability 
in recent times. It is supported by a vast amount of empirical evidences that underline the 
importance of having an interest rate responsiveness above a critical stability threshold of one 
to one to changes in inflation.73 The significance of the Taylor Principle implication can be 
examined via a simple economic model and a graphical illustration: 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = −𝛽(𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 − 𝑟) + 𝑢𝑡         (10) 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑦𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑡         (11) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝜋 ∗ 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑔𝑦 ∗ 𝑦𝑡
∗ + 𝑔0         (12) 
 
where   
𝑦𝑡 represents the percentage deviation of real output from potential output, 
  𝑖𝑡 represents the short-term nominal interest rate, 
  𝜋𝑡 represents the inflation rate, 
  𝑢𝑡 and 𝑡 are serially uncorrelated stochastic shocks with a zero mean, 
  𝛽, 𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 are the positive parameters of the proposed model, 
  𝑔𝜋,  𝑔𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔0 are the assumed policy parameters. 
 
In the model above, the reduced-form parameters 𝛽, 𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 can be generalized and 
depend on the policy parameters 𝑔𝜋,  𝑔𝑦 and  𝑔0. Equation (10) represents the equilibrium 
condition in the goods market, in the guise of the old IS curve. Furthermore, Equation (11), 
which implicates that prices are sticky and only slowly vary over time, represents some price 
adjustment (PA) equation.74 By substituting equation (12) into equation (10), an aggregate 
demand (AD) relationship between 𝜋 and 𝑦 can be obtained. The corresponding, derived 
slope can then be described as: 
                                                 
73 Taylor (1999). p. 331 
74 Taylor (1998). p. 10-11 





 .           (13) 
 
It is important to note that the sign of the slope depends on the size of the parameters 
of the policy rules. A policy induced change in the short-term nominal interest rate of less 
than one for one in response to an increase in inflation (𝑔𝜋 < 1) would turn the slope of the 
AD function positive, whereas a change of more than one for one with inflation (𝑔𝜋 > 1) 
would turn its slope negative. The relationship is graphically illustrated in Figure 2. 
Moreover, the PA equation is represented as a flat line, as the current level of inflation does 
not appear in the equation. An assumed surprise price shock  will then lead to an upwards 





Figure 2: Stable versus unstable monetary policy rules 
Based on Taylor (1998). p. 34 
                                                 
75 Taylor (1998). p. 12-13 
𝑦 𝑦 
PA PA 
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Now consider both illustrative cases in Figure 2, a stable monetary policy that exceeds 
the critical stability threshold of 𝑔𝜋 = 1 (as indicated by the dashed line) and an unstable 
monetary policy that stays below the critical stability threshold line. The reason the first case 
is considered to be a stable monetary policy is because an upwards shift in the PA equation 
would lead to a decline in real output, as monetary authorities raise the real interest rate in 
response to the inflationary pressure. This in turn will reduce inflation, bringing it back to its 
desired level. In contrast, an unstable monetary policy will lead to a decrease in the real 
interest rate, thereby further pushing output and inflation away from their desired levels and 
consequently promoting economic instability.76  
Hence, it is shown that the observance of the Taylor Principle is essential for a 
stabilizing monetary policy. A variety of empirical studies of the Taylor Rule or of Taylor-
type Rules for different economies and time periods strongly validate the importance of the 
Taylor Principle. A small proportion of selected empirical studies includes, for instance, 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) and Taylor (1999) for the U.S., Nelson (2001) for the U.K., 
and Kuttner and Posen (2004) for Japan.77   
 
2.2.2. The Taylor Principle in prospect of the Zero-lower Bound   
The Taylor principle, which states that policymakers should increase real interest rates 
when inflationary pressures arise, is ubiquitous in modern monetary economics. 
Nevertheless, when nominal interest rates approach the zero-lower bound, monetary policy 
rule relationships and economic assumptions which were taken for granted alter dramatically. 
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that under this problematic economic condition, monetary 
authorities respond identically to changes in inflation and output as when nominal interest 
rates were significantly above the lower bound.78  
A zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates – a policy instrument for most modern 
central banks – is a serious concern, as it drastically restrains monetary policy 
implementations up to the point where monetary authorities are no longer able to stimulate 
                                                 
76 Taylor (1998). p. 13 
77 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). p. 17; Taylor (1999). p. 330; Nelson (2001). p. 30  
    Kuttner and Posen (2004). p. 70 
78 Chevapatrakul, Kim, Mizen (2009). p. 1705 
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the economy by using the nominal interest rate channel. This problematic phenomenon is 
widely referred to as the so-called liquidity trap.79  
In more detail, until recently it was believed that there was a notable asymmetry in the 
implementation of monetary policy decisions, which were based on variations in interest 
rates. In extreme expansionary time periods when inflation could potentially rise to 
undesirable levels, policymakers could increase the magnitude of their policy rate instrument 
to any desired level, which they believed to be necessary. Contrarily, during times 
pronounced as recessions, the policy rate adjustments were assumed to be limited by the zero 
lower bound. As soon as the zero lower bound were reached, short-term interest rate 
instruments would potentially lose their power and could not be further downwards 
adjusted.80 Contrarily, the quantity of money instrument is still operative in times of severe 
recessions where the policy rates approach the zero interest rate floor. Following this 
phenomenon, a variety of central banks around the globe initiated excessive, large-scale asset 
purchase programs to stimulate the economy, known as quantitative easing programs (QE).81 
However, various central banks have recently challenged the assumption of a  
potential limit on interest rates due to the severances of the financial crisis and the disability 
to sufficiently ensure recovery. Thus, monetary authorities in Bulgaria, Denmark, the 
European Union, Hungary, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland have started to engage into new 
territory and lowered policy rates below the zero lower bound, adopting negative nominal 
interest rates. However, as this approach resembles a completely new, unconventional policy 
approach, the economic effect incorporates a high degree of uncertainty and has to be subject 
to future research.82 Nevertheless, numerous studies have stressed the importance of avoiding 
vicinity of the the zero lower bound as conventional policy measures alter dramatically close 
to the zero interest rate floor. 
Thus, various studies argue that vicinity of the zero lower-bound should lead to 
increases in the magnitude and responsiveness of central banks’ policy decisions to restrain 
further unintentional decreases in inflation and to avoid liquidity traps.83 For instance, Kohn 
stated that in order to fight against the prospect of potential deflation, central banks that 
                                                 
79 Kato and Nishiyama (2005). p. 98 – A liquidity trap is a situation in which prevailing interest rates are low, 
whereas saving rates are high due to the fact that private agents expect an adverse event such as deflation. This 
situation nullifies monetary policy actions and can lead to severe economic instability as well as to deflationary 
spirals. 
80 Billi (2012). p. 2 
81 Joyce, Miles, Scott and Vayanos (2012). p. 271 
82 IMF (2007). p. 4 
83 Chevapatrakul, Kim and Mizen (2009). p. 1706  
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operate at or close to the lower bound need to behave extraordinarily forceful to any slightest 
signs of downward demand shocks.84 Chevapatrakul et. al. further argued that forward- 
looking monetary authorities have to analyze the cost of operating under the zero-lower 
bound and implement precautionary actions to decrease the probability of deflation. This 
forceful and pre-emptive monetary policy behavior is necessary to directly influence inflation 
expectations, by indicating to the private sector that the policymakers will try to avoid 
deflation by all means necessary. If monetary authorities’ actions and announcements appear 
to be credible, inflation expectation should decrease by less in response to the downward 
demand shock.85 
Similar behavior is also recommended by Kato and Nishiyama, who define forceful 
monetary policy aggression by two propositions. Firstly, it comprises an incentive for 
policymakers to be extremely expansionary in the knowledge of a potential deflationary 
spiral. This forceful monetary policy behavior leads to a reduction in nominal interest rates 
by more than normally would have been advocated by an optimal Taylor rule. Secondly, this 
expansionary behavior should accelerate if the zero-lower bound is sufficiently close. Hence, 
the more realistic the prospect of deflation appears to be, the more accelerated cuts in interest 
rates as a direct response to falling inflation should be observed. 
Kato and Nishiyama, indeed, found empirical evidence for a more expansionary, 
monetary reaction function than the simple Taylor rule. Therefore, they argued that an 
appropriate reaction function should be concave rather than linear in the state variables, 
inflation and output gaps, close to the zero-lower bound.86  
Their empirical findings are partly confirmed by Chevapatrakul et al. who also found 
a nonlinear policy response to inflation, when rates are sufficiently low. Hence, it is stated 
that optimal monetary policy should consider the variation in the degree of aggression at 
different quantiles along the interest rate distribution. Both empirical studies showed that 
monetary policies should respond differently depending on the state of external economic 
conditions, and thus strongly advocated nonlinear, Taylor-type reaction functions. 87 
  
                                                 
84 Kohn (1996). p. 7 
85 Chevapatrakul, Kim and Mizen (2009). p. 1706 
86 Kato and Nishiyama (2005). p. 118 
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2.3.   The Evolution of Taylor-type Rules  
Over the last two decades, the simple but elegant instrument policy rule developed by 
Taylor has become a major tool for evaluating monetary policies of central banks and for 
analyzing their overall performance.88 As the Taylor Rule and the incorporated Taylor 
principle have gained more and more attention, various studies developed and analyzed 
slightly modified versions of the rule. Those modifications, which still share the spirit of 
Taylor’s initially proposed reaction function, are in the literature often referred to as Taylor-
type Rules. Moreover, applications of Taylor-type Rules are not only limited to academic 
communities and monetary authorities, but are also utilized by many other financial 
institutions to analyze and forecast monetary policy decisions of central banks, further 
enhancing their usefulness.89 
During the last few decades, various well-recognized studies demonstrated the use and 
viability of Taylor-type rules, most prominently Taylor himself (1999), Judd and Rudebusch 
(1998) and Clarida et al. (2000). Taylor demonstrated that monetary policy behavior of most 
of the developed countries can be explained and evaluated to a large extent by his proposed 
reaction function, initially published in his 1993 paper “Discretion vs. Policy Rules in 
Practice”.90 Afterwards, Judd and Rudebusch incorporated the tendency of interest rate 
smoothing behavior of central banks into the proposed reaction function in a modified way.91 
Lastly, Clarida et al. later examined the fit of the Taylor Rule with a forward-looking 
character.92 All studies demonstrated that the behavior of monetary authorities and their 
corresponding monetary policy decisions fit Taylor-type Rules reasonably well. Initially, 
studies on Taylor’s reaction function had commonly used ex post revised data. Following the 
empirical work of Orphanides, it has become common practice to use real-time observation 
data. By using real-time data, namely the information set that was available to monetary 
authorities during the time the monetary policy actions were decided on, it can be accounted 
for incomplete information of policymakers. Orphanides found substantial differences 
between Taylor Rule estimates using ex post revised data and real-time data. The resulting 
differences were due to the previously overlooked fact that output and inflation estimates are 
not accurately, contemporaneously known to monetary authorities at the time of the policy 
                                                 
88 Sauer and Sturm (2007). p. 1 
89 Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke (2008). p. 1  
90 Taylor (1999). p. 339 
91Judd and Rudebusch (1998). p. 7 
92 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). p. 148 
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decision.93 Lastly, various academic research has emphasized the possibility of non-linear 
Taylor-type Rules. For instance, Rabanal provided strong evidence that central bank 
responses, to changing economic variables, vary over business cycles.94 Moreover, further 
studies, for example conducted by Cukierman and Muscatelli, report asymmetrical behavior 
of the Fed depending on the policy regime.95 Hence, modern Taylor Rule morphologies 
should incorporate the possibility of non-linearity and asymmetric central bank behavior. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that despite many new variations of the 
Taylor Rule, various economists, for example former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
emphasized the importance of holding on to the important Taylor Principle as it is an 
ubiquitous, vital condition for the observance of economic stability and a central tenet of 
stabilizing monetary policy.96 
 
2.3.1. Interest Rate Smoothing and the Specification of the Taylor Rule 
One common morphology of Taylor-type Rules is the incorporation of interest rate 
smoothing behaviors of central banks into the plain form of the Taylor Rule. Rudebusch 
observed that the Fed often tend to adjust short-term interest rates in gradual, small steps into 
the same direction, rather than making instantaneous adjustments towards the recommended 
target level.97 Similar patterns have also been observed in various other countries. For 
instance, Lowe and Ellis have presented strong evidence for interest rate smoothing behaviors 
of central banks in Australia, Japan, Germany and the U.K.98 Furthermore, Goodhart has 
presented evidence for similar observations in France, Italy, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Sweden and Austria.99  
Both studies indicate that the short-term interest rate smoothing behavior, which is 
evident in the continuous, gradual target adjustments of most central banks, partly 
discourages fast, frequent reversals of prior interest rate target changes.100 Thus, Lowe and 
Ellis, even emphasize that interest rate smoothing represents optimal monetary policy 
behavior. The time lag of monetary policy effects on real economic activity in combination 
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with the fact that an economy is subject to various shocks suggest that monetary authorities 
should frequently change the level and direction of interest rates. However, those frequent 
changes are unlikely to greatly reduce the variation in output and inflation, but would rather 
generate destabilizing effects. Additionally, frequent changes in the interest rate could 
significantly harm the credibility and accountability of central banks’ initial policy 
announcements. None of these developments seems desirable as they could lead to economic 
instability. Therefore, various economists argue that interest rate smoothing has essential, 
stabilizing characteristics for the economy.101  
The hypothesis of deliberately adjusting nominal interest rates in small steps to reduce 
interest rate volatility was confirmed by the former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan as well. 
According to Greenspan, the Fed implemented “measured and deliberated” changes in short-
term interest rates to not introduce additional volatility into financial markets and into the real 
economy.102 Sack and Wiedland considered this behavior even as evidence that central banks 
have an additional objective of minimizing interest rate volatility, in addition to their price 
and output stabilization goals.103  
As interest rate smoothing appears to be a common practice followed by most central 
banks, most econometric specifications of the Taylor rule incorporate it in the form of an 
autoregressive (AR) model with one time lag. In these specifications, it is hypothesized that 
the current interest rate is a weighted function of the rule based target and its lagged value 
from the last period. The corresponding AR(1) model can be expressed as: 
 
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝑝 ∗ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑡        (14) 
 
where   
p (with 0 < p < 1) represents the degree of interest rate smoothing, 
  𝑖𝑡 represents the nominal short-term interest rate at time t, 
  𝑖𝑡−1 represents the nominal short-term interest rate at time t-1, 
  𝑖𝑡∗ represents the target interest rate at time t, 
  𝑡 represents an i.i.d. exogenous random shock to the interest rate at time t.104 
                                                 
101 Lowe and Ellis (1998). p. 286 
102 See Greenspan (2001) – Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan (Speech at the Economic Policy Conference, 
October 2001. 
103 Sack and Wiedland (2000). p. 206 
104 Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke (2008). p. 3 
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The more instantaneous monetary policy authorities change the nominal interest rate 
towards its desired target level, the more p tends to approach 0, with p = 0 stating that the 
central bank does not follow any interest rate smoothing at all.105  
 






i    (15) 
 
Equation (15) transforms into the traditional Taylor Rule if p is set to 0 and accounts 
for common interest smoothing behavior of central banks if 0 < p < 1.106 
 
2.3.2. The Morphology to a Forward-looking, Taylor-type Policy Rule 
Another common morphology of the Taylor Rule is the incorporation of forward-
looking estimates into the policy reaction function, rather than the reliance on lagged values 
of output and inflation. The importance of a forward-looking dimension with regards to 
monetary policies has already been acknowledged by Keynes, who emphasized that “if we 
wait until a price movement is actually afoot before applying remedial measures, we may be 
too late.”107 Nearly a century later, former Fed Chairman Greenspan still stressed the 
importance of forward-looking monetary policy decisions and stated in a testimony: 
“Because monetary policy works with a lag, it is not the conditions prevailing today that are 
critical but rather those likely to prevail six to twelve month, or even longer, from now.”108 
Various economic studies during the end of the 1990s confirmed that desired 
stabilizing monetary policies in the G7 countries during that time, indeed, appeared to be 
driven more by anticipated future estimates of economic variables than by their 
corresponding lagged actual outcomes.109 A few of the most prominent studies include, but 
are not limited to, Clarida and Gertler (1997), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler (2000) and Orphanides (2001). Clarida and Gertler showed that the German 
Central Bank conducted stabilizing monetary policy by adjusting short-term interest rates 
                                                 
105 Murray, Papell and Razhevskyy (2015). p. 920 
106 Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke (2008). p. 4 
107 See Keynes (1923). p. 148 
108 See Greenspan (1997) – Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Budget. 
109 Batini and Haldane (1999). p. 157 
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based on anticipated rather than lagged inflation gaps.110 According to Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler, the G3 countries (Germany, Japan and the U.S.) and to a lesser extent the E3 
countries (the U.K., France and Italy) conducted monetary policy decisions based on 
forward-looking estimates already since 1979.111 Furthermore, Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
provided strong empirical evidence that the Fed conducted systematically different monetary 
policy approaches in the pre- and post-Volcker regime in their second paper. Whereas during 
the more unstable pre-Volcker regime, monetary policy decisions of the Fed seemed not to 
comply with the forward-looking Taylor Principle, the more stable post-Volcker regime 
periods did.112 
Orphanides further stressed the importance of analyzing policy rules with a forward-
looking horizon of six to twelve month based on real time data, as Orphanides stated that 
monetary policies should be pre-emptive in nature.113 All of those studies, therefore, postulate 
that stabilizing monetary policies need to account for forward-looking, anticipated economic 
variables rather than lagged ones. 
As one of the first pioneers in the field of implicit Taylor-type rules, Clarida et al. 
proposed a forward-looking variant of Taylor’s initially proposed reaction function.114 
Following Clarida et al. work, the incorporation of forward-looking, expected variables leads 
to following implicit reaction function: 
 
𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑟∗ +  𝜋𝑡+ℎ + βπ ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + βy ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦
∗)    (16) 
 
where    
𝑖𝑡
∗ is the desired short-term nominal interest rate, 
  𝑟∗ is the constant long-run equilibrium real interest rate, 
𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) is the expected deviation of the h-period ahead inflation rate 
(𝜋𝑡+ℎ) from its desired target level (𝜋∗), 
𝐸𝑡(𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦
∗) is the expected deviation of the h-period ahead output (𝑦𝑡+ℎ) 
from its desired target level (𝑦∗), 
                                                 
110 Clarida and Gertler (1997). p. 405 
111 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). p. 1065 
112 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). p. 177 
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βπ and βy are positive coefficients that indicate the intensity with which 
monetary authorities react to deviations from desired target levels. 
 
By utilizing forward-looking variables, Clarida et al. accounted for the pre-emptive 
nature of monetary policy decisions and emphasized the fact that monetary authorities can 
only affect inflationary pressure with some time lag.115 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Clarida et al.’s forward-looking variant represents 
a special case of the Taylor Rule. If either lagged inflation or a linear combination of lagged 
inflation and the output gap is statistically sufficient to predict future inflation, the presented 
forward-looking policy rule will transform into the basic Taylor Rule. On the other hand,  
the proposed equation allows for the incorporation of a vast amount of information, which are 
relevant for forming expectations about the future state of the economy and can be captured 
by the corresponding forecast variables. 
Clarida et al. further argued that by accounting for the interest rate smoothing 
behavior of central banks, as elaborated in the previous section, the forward-looking policy 
rule becomes less restrictive and serves as a more appropriate proxy for actual changes in the 
fund rates. Combining the AR(1) interest rate smoothing equation (15) with the 
advantageous, forward-looking Taylor-type Rule (16) yields the following policy reaction 
function:116 
            
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∗ (𝑟
∗ +  𝜋𝑡+ℎ + βπ ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + βy ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦
∗)) + 𝑝 ∗ 𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝐸𝑡( 𝑡+ℎ
𝑖 )           (17) 
    
Equation (17) represents a common econometrical specification of the initial Taylor 
Rule that incorporates both previously explained aspects – central banks interest smoothing 
behavior and the pre-emptive nature of monetary policy decisions. Therefore, it is nowadays 
widely used to describe and analyze monetary policy actions and to evaluate central banks 
policy behaviors.117  
                                                 
115 Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke (2008). p. 3 
116 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). p. 151-153 
117 Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke (2008). p. 4 
   - 31 - 
 
 
2.3.3. Dynamic Coefficients - Taylor-type Rules and Business Cycles 
So far, all elaborated reaction function morphologies have focused on linear Taylor-
type Rules. However, recent empirical papers have stressed the significance of asymmetric, 
nonlinear policy behavior of most central banks. Within this context, two important questions 
arise. First of all, have the coefficients of the Taylor Rule changed over time? Secondly, is 
there any evidence that monetary policy responses vary systematically between business 
cycles, namely between expansion and recession periods? Apparently, the answer to both 
questions is positive.118 
Past empirical literature on monetary policy rules has primarily analyzed whether any 
structural break in the Taylor Rule exists. In this context, a strong emphasis has been placed 
on the analysis of pre- and post-Greenspan regime periods in the U.S. For example, Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler come to the conclusion that the Fed followed a more excessive inflation 
stabilization policy in the post-Greenspan period when compared with the pre-Greenspan 
period.119 Nevertheless, Rabanal pointed out that it is not entirely clear whether the results 
were mainly driven by different chairman preferences or by different reactions to distinct 
economic shocks. 
According to Rabanal’s empirical findings, there is strong evidence that the Taylor 
rule coefficients shift between expansion and recession cycles, even when accounted for 
different chairman preferences. During expansion periods, monetary policy appears to be 
primarily concerned with inflation stabilization, while the focus shifts to output stabilization 
during recession periods. Additionally, interest rate smoothing behavior tends to be lower in 
economic downturns when compared to expansion periods, as central banks seem to act 
quicker and more forceful in sight of prospective recessions.120 Similar findings for the U.S. 
are reported by Petersen.121 Moreover, the presented results are further supported by the 
aforementioned phenomenon that central bank behavior appears to be extraordinary forceful 
in prospect of reaching the zero lower bound, which is normally the case during (great) 
recessions.122 Cukierman and Muscatelli also validated a nonlinear Taylor-type rules in the 
U.K. and U.S. However, instead of solely attributing the non- linearity to different business 
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cycles, they analyzed whether the type of nonlinearity changes among monetary policy 
regime approaches. Indeed, in addition to the conclusion that the type of asymmetry in 
monetary policies changes with the economic environment, they emphasized that inflation 
targeting policy regimes seem to have a convex Taylor rule reaction function whereas non- 
inflation targeting policy regimes tend to have a concave reaction function. This indicates the 
advent of dominant inflation avoidance within inflation targeting policy regimes (at least 
during their initial introduction) and dominant recession avoidance within alternative policy 
regimes.123 Finally, Castro presented results for a nonlinear monetary policy adopted by the 
ECB. According to Castro, the ECB only reacts actively to inflation when inflation exceeds 
2.5%. Moreover, the ECB seemingly only reacts to business cycles during stabilized inflation 
periods, normally when inflation is below 2.5%. Castro explains this behavior with 
asymmetric policy preferences, which depend on the state of the economy. However, he only 
found weak evidence for a nonlinear policy model in the U.S.124 
 All in all, all of the studies discussed above found at least some evidence for non-
linear monetary policy behavior. Therefore, in order to accurately describe and evaluate 
monetary policy decisions, monetary policy rules should consider incorporating the 
possibility of nonlinear policy behavior.   
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2.4.   Inflation Targeting  
In practice, however, no central bank is strictly conducting monetary policy only 
based on some mechanical instrument rule. Monetary policy authorities in open economies 
have to take much more information into consideration than ordinary rules normally rely on 
and thus, need to frequently reconsider their policy decisions whenever receiving new, 
relevant information. Therefore, a monetary policy instrument rule is never used to commit 
the bank to some policy actions but rather serves as an evaluation tool and guideline for 
actual monetary policy decisions, as already roughly elaborated in the broad interpretation of 
the Taylor Rule in Section 2.2.125 Discretionary monetary policy is the rule. This is in line 
with statements by former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and other Fed officials, who 
frequently point out the disadvantages of rule based frameworks. Even though rules might 
perform quite well during conventional times, they offer only limited guidelines when the 
economy faces large, unpredictable shocks.126 
However, if central banks do not commit to publicly postulated policy rules, their 
behavior is more similar to a discretionary policy regime. Hence, such behavior should 
theoretically be inferior, since it should lead to high levels of inflation as a direct result of the 
postulated inflation bias of discretionary policy regimes, as illustrated in section 2.1.1. 
Notwithstanding, several empirical studies argued that some discretionary monetary 
policy approaches may be capable of avoiding the time inconsistency issue, while providing a 
high level of desired flexibility. Therefore, operational monetary policy needs to entail some 
more flexible targeting rules, which have the potential to provide some kind of necessary, 
credible commitment, namely the commitment of minimizing a predefined loss function.127 
Moreover, the semantics may be a little misleading. Even though “targeting rules” comprise 
the word “rule”, it can be argued, as for example by Bernanke and Mishkin, that central 
banks following such an approach can be seen as some kind of constrained discretionary 
policy regimes. Bernanke and Mishkin argue that generally targeting rules do not provide 
operational instructions on how to set instruments based on some independent economic 
variables. Additionally, unlike simple instrument rules, policymakers do not need to neglect 
information that are not defined by the respective rule.128 Instead, monetary authorities are 
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free to act in accordance with their own judgement and set the instruments based on all 
available information as long as they commit to the predefined target. Such targeting rules 
provide a significant degree of discretionary freedom and can thus be defined as constrained 
discretionary policies. One of the most widely used and arguably most successful targeting 
rules is the so-called inflation targeting policy regime.129 
During the end of the twentieth century, a number of central banks in both 
industrialized and emerging countries followed the example of New Zealand`s monetary 
authorities and adopted an innovative strategy framework for monetary policy known as 
“inflation targeting”. The rapidly increasing number of inflation targeting adaptors and its 
apparently stabilizing effects on the economy have triggered an intensifying debate about the 
benefits and implications of inflation targeting between academics and practitioners alike, 
giving rise to vast amount of research.130 Nearly three decades since its initial introduction, 
numerous studies have confirmed that inflation targeting is indeed a powerful tool of 
monetary policy.131 Early empirical work includes, for example, Bernanke, who argued that 
inflation targeting promotes both price stability and well-anchored inflation expectations.132 
Mishkin et al. postulated a similar view and argued that inflation targeting has been widely 
successful in maintaining low levels of inflation and increasing transparency.133 And, 
according to Mervyn King: “Inflation targets form a clear and transparent framework for 
monetary policy… I think they are here to stay.”134  
While it has been argued that earlier studies could suffer from only having had access 
to a small number of observations, more recent studies provide similar findings as well.135 
For instance, Mishkin and Hebbel found significant performance improvements for central 
banks that adopted inflation targeting, and argued that both inflation and output persistence 
are significantly lower in inflation targeting regimes when compared to other policy 
regimes.136 Pétursson came to the same conclusion in a later study.137 However, empirical 
work that divided inflation targeting regimes in subgroups of OECD countries and emerging 
economies indicated that the average beneficial effect on inflation and inflation variability is 
                                                 
129 Svensson (1998). p. 681 
130 Mishkin and Hebbel (2007). p. 3 
131 Martin and Milas (2004). p. 209 
132 Bernanke (2003). p. 14 
133 Mishkin and Posen (1997). p. 96 
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only statistically significant in emerging countries.138 While Lin and Ye and Angeriz and 
Arestis, among others, found insignificant results for most OECD countries, Batini and 
Laxton found significant results for reduced inflation variability for inflation targeting 
regimes for a variety of emerging economies.139 Nevertheless, despite the different results for 
OECD countries and emerging economies, the general verdict of inflation targeting has been 
mostly positive so far. As a result, it has been adopted by more than 25 countries around the 
globe.140 Additionally, many major central banks, such as the European Central Bank (ECB), 
the Swiss National Bank and for a longer timer horizon the U.S. Fed, have adopted many 
characteristics of inflation targeting regimes, even though they have not officially conducted 
monetary policy under the concept of inflation targeting.141 
 
 
Table 1: List of inflation targeting central banks 
Based on Roger (2010). p. 47 (Adjusted by recent inflation targeting adopters) 
                                                 
138 Svensson (2010). p. 9 
139 Lin and Ye (2007). p.10; Angeriz, Arestis (2008). p. 314; Batini, Laxton (2007). p. 494 
140 Svensson (2010). p. 1 
141 Roger (2009). p. 4 – The U.S Fed became an official inflation targeting policy regime in 2012. 
List of Inflation Targeting Policy Regimes
Country Adoption date Inflation target rate
New Zealand 1990 1% - 3%
Canada 1991 2% +/-1%
United Kingdom 1992 2% +/-1%
Sweden 1993 2% +/-1%
Australia 1993 2-3%
Czech Republic 1997 3% +/-1%
Israel 1998 2% +/-1%
Poland 1999 2.5% +/-1%
Brazil 1999 4.5% +/-2%
Chile 1999 3% +/-1%
Colombia 2000 2% - 4%
South Africa 2000 3% - 6%
Thailand 2001 0.5% - 3%
Korea 2001 3% +/-1%
Mexico 2001 3% +/-1%
Iceland 2001 2.5% - 1.5%
Norway 2001 2.5% +/-1%
Hungary 2001 3% +/-1%
Peru 2002 2% +/-1%
Philippines 2002 4.5% +/-1%
Guatemala 2005 5% +/-1%
Indonesia 2005 4% - 6%
Romania 2005 3.5% +/-1%
Turkey 2006 6-5% +/-1%
Serbia 2006 4% - 8%
Ghana 2007 14.5% +/-1%
Serbia 2009 2% +/-1%
United States 2012 2%
Japan 2013 2%
India 2016 4%
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In practice, despite the fact that various central banks have nowadays instituted 
explicit inflation targeting in slightly modified forms, some common characteristics can still 
be identified. Fundamentally, inflation targeting can be described as (1) a monetary policy 
framework that involves an announcement of an official, explicit numerical target or a range 
of the inflation rate at one or more horizons by monetary authorities and (2) an operating 
procedure, which uses internal conditional inflation forecasts as intermediate target 
variables.142 Achieving the numerical inflation target becomes the primary objective of 
central banks, although it still provides some room for additional, secondary objectives, 
which will be discussed in section 2.4.1. “Strict and Flexible Inflation Targeting”. 
Furthermore, the optimal instrument rate path is set to be consistent with the corresponding 
inflation forecasts and therefore sets the basis for current policy instrument settings. Thus, the 
actual operational decision making process is commonly referred to as inflation forecast 
targeting.143 In some way, the forward-looking procedure is a direct consequence of the time 
lags in the monetary transmission of monetary policy decisions and the fact that monetary 
authorities only have an imperfect control over inflation.144 Moreover, the operating 
procedures can also be seen as a mathematical necessity to ensure that the first order 
conditions for a minimum of the under targeting rules required loss functions are 
approximately fulfilled.145 Lastly, (3) monetary authorities have to credibly acknowledge that 
price stability is their primary goal to promote necessary credibility and accountability. Thus, 
inflation targeting regimes normally encompass a significant degree of transparency.146 To 
promote transparency, inflation targeting central banks publish so-called “Inflation or 
Economic Forecasts Reports” on a regular basis, explaining and justifying policy actions and 
forecasts to the general public.147 According to King, inflation targeting can consequently be 
defined as a “framework for making and communicating policy decisions.”148 
Nowadays, many central banks, especially in emerging markets, call themselves 
inflation targeting regimes. Yet, their monetary policy framework should not be regarded as 
real inflation targeting. In order to be characterized as a real inflation targeting regime, a 
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credible, institutional commitment, which includes a clear, preferably legislated mandate for 
monetary policies directed towards low levels of inflation, is needed. Moreover, central bank 
must guarantee instrument independency. Lastly, monetary authorities should be accountable 
in some way for achieving the desired mandate. Only if these additional requirements are 
fulfilled, central banks inflation targeting announcements can be seen as truly credible and 
can therefore fulfill their full potential.149  
 
2.4.1. Strict and Flexible Inflation Targeting 
Theoretically, inflation targeting central bank regimes can be further distinguished as 
strict and flexible regimes. Whereas strict inflation targeting regimes are merely concerned 
about deviations of projected inflation from their desired target levels, flexible inflation 
targeting regimes emphasize additionally on other explicit and/or implicit economic 
variables, such as the variability of output and employment.150  
The consideration whether inflation targeting should solely keep inflation close to the 
desired target or should incorporate other economic variable as well can also be seen as a 
discussion over the optimal degree of policy activism. Consider an economic shock that 
results in an increase in inflation. Strict inflation targeting regimes would follow a vigorous 
and activist policy with extreme adjustments to policy instruments in order to stabilize 
inflation around its target level. However, even though drastic and frequent changes in policy 
instruments might be successful in stabilizing inflation, they are likely to lead to high, 
undesired variability in other economic variables as well as underpin the predictability and 
credibility of monetary policies. Moreover, continuous whipsawing of the interest rate policy 
instrument under over-activist policy could trigger an instrument-instability problem. This 
problem describes the effect that extreme and frequent changes and reversals of the policy 
instrument are making it less effective over time. Thus, larger adjustments to the 
corresponding instruments are necessary to have the desired effect on inflation levels, up to 
the point where it may have destabilizing rather than stabilizing effects on inflation and other 
economic variables.151 Instead, flexible inflation targeting is a more gradual approach with 
less policy activism. More precisly, as inflation is gradually brought back to its desired target 
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level, under the consideration of its effect on other economic variables at a longer time 
horizon, potential economic instability can be avoided.152 
Unsurprisingly, there is a common consensus among monetary authorities and 
academics alike that inflation targeting is nearly always flexible in practice. Central banks 
tend to stabilize inflation around a desired target level as well as to emphasize on stabilizing 
the variability of output. Furthermore, as monetary policy is most effective if it is pre-emptive 
due to its lagged impact on target variables and imperfect control over inflation, the monetary 
policy rate under inflation targeting is set conditional on the forecast target variables. The 
forecasted economic variables can therefore be seen as intermediate target variables. Thus, 
the operating procedure is often referred to as inflation forecast targeting. More precisely, the 
objectives of inflation targeting central banks can be well approximated by a standard 
quadratic intertemporal loss function, consisting of the sum of the expected, squared inflation 
gap and a relative weight times the expected squared output gap as the intermediate target 
variables.153 
𝐿𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛿
𝑇((𝜋𝑡+𝜏 − 𝜋




     (18) 
where 
𝐸𝑡 represents expectations conditional on information available at time t, 
𝜋𝑡 denotes inflation at time t, 
𝜋∗ denotes the desired target level of inflation, 
𝛾𝑡 denotes the output gap at time t, 
𝜔 a relative weight on output gap stabilization efforts, 
𝛿 where 0< 𝛿 < 1 is a discount factor.154 
 
With regards to the intertemporal loss function, the set target levels are π∗ for 
inflation and zero for the potential output gap. Furthermore, the relative weighting factor 𝜔 
corresponds to the degree of flexibility, with 𝜔 > 0 implying flexible inflation targeting and 
𝜔 = 0 implying strict inflation targeting. 
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The main objective of inflation targeting policy regimes is to minimize the respective 
intertemporal loss function. Furthermore, it is widely agreed on that inflation targeting policy 
regimes generally do not follow overambitious output targets above potential output levels, 
but rather target an output gap that is consistent with the natural output level.155 This 
modification is sufficient to eliminate the time inconsistency issue. Hence, the minimization 
of the intertemporal loss function provides a commitment that, if credible, would eliminate 
the postulated inflation bias under discretionary policy regimes suggested by Kydland, 
Prescott, Barro and Gordan.156 
When analyzing flexible inflation targeting and the relative weight of the output 
stabilization factor, it is crucial to point out that there is a fundamental difference between the 
inflation target rate and the implied output gap. Whereas monetary authorities can 
theoretically achieve sustainable inflation at any non-negative level, they cannot affect the 
sustainable long-term output level, which is determined by other factors rather than monetary 
policy alone. For instance, these factors include, but are not limited to, technological 
improvements and the efficiency of the corresponding economy. Monetary authorities can 
only affect the stability of the corresponding resource utilization.157 Consequently, an 
asymmetry exists since the targeted inflation level is subject to choice, while the output gap is 
fixed at zero. This is consistent with the assumption that inflation stabilization is the primary 
objective pursued.158 Hence, flexible inflation targeting can be defined as a hierarchical 
mandate. Furthermore, the objective of central banks under flexible inflation targeting is to 
minimize the respective loss function, which includes both an inflation target and an output 
stabilization goal. Taking this into account, flexible inflation targeting can also be defined as 
a dual mandate. According to Svensson, in the end inflation targeting can be interpreted as 
having both characteristics, a hierarchical and a dual mandate with no direct conflict arising 
between them.159 
Moreover, it is widely agreed on that the degree of pursued flexibility depends on the 
level of credibility of the corresponding central banks. For instance, Svensson argued that 
new inflation targeting policy regimes have to prioritize the establishment of credibility. 
Thus, they have to put less weight on stabilizing output variability, when compared to mature 
                                                 
155 Svensson (2002). p. 775-776 
156 Svensson and Woodford (2004). p. 20 
157 Svensson (2008). p. 2 
158 Svensson (2002). p. 775 
159 Svensson (2003). p. 3 
   - 40 - 
 
 
inflation targeting central banks. Mature inflation targeting regimes can assign relatively 
more weight on stabilizing resource utilization, due to their already established credibility of 
maintaining price stability under low levels of inflation.160 Alichi et al. shared a similar view 
and argued that in countries with inflation rates significantly above their target, new inflation 
targeting adopters’ primary goal should be to establish credibility. Therefore, the 
corresponding policy regimes should place a great emphasis on inflation reduction and less 
weight on the output gap factor.161 These findings are in line with the already elaborated 
empirical evidence of Cukierman and Muscatelli who also emphasized the existence of 
dominant inflation avoidance in newly established inflation targeting regimes.162 
 
2.4.2. Transparency, Credibility and Accountability 
 Over the last three decades, an increasing number of central banks have introduced 
rising standards of transparency and independence. Although central banks have long 
recognized the importance of independence, the significance of central bank transparency has 
only started to emerge during the 1990s. This trend is particularly evident from a well-
documented survey of 94 central banks in 1998, which revealed that 74% of all central banks 
under analysis considered transparency a vital aspect of their current and future monetary 
policy frameworks.163 Furthermore, greater movements towards rising transparency are also 
evident with the fact that an increasing number of central banks have started to communicate 
their monetary policy objectives as well as their definition and quantification of price stability 
and inflation targets to the general public.164 
The announcement of an official, credible numerical inflation target or range and the 
publication of inflation forecasts are central pillars of inflation targeting and important 
prerequisites for its operating success. The accompanying emphasis on transparency under 
inflation targeting is exceptional in the history of central banks and primarily stems from the 
insight that monetary policy is to a great extent the “management of private sector 
expectations.” Therefore, a crucial prerequisite for maintaining price stability under inflation 
targeting is the anchoring of these private sector inflation expectations 𝐸(𝜋𝑡) to the 
                                                 
160 Svensson (2010). p. 2 
161 Alichi, et al. (2009). p. 3 
162 Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008). p. 3 
163 Geraats (2002). p. 1 
164 Melecký, Palenzuela and Söderström (2008). p. 371 
   - 41 - 
 
 
announced policy inflation target 𝜋𝑡∗.
165 Leiderman and Svensson and Bernanke et al. proved 
that an increase in transparency of central banks can improve their credibility and 
accountability. It facilitates the anchoring of private agents’ long-term inflation expectations 
to announced policy objectives, as private agents have an explicit target against which they 
can evaluate monetary policy actions.166 Furthermore, the expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve states that inflation expectations have a direct impact on realized inflation. Hence, by 
providing a credible nominal anchor for inflation expectations, which observance can be 
monitored, inflation targeting should reduce macroeconomic volatility. This volatility arises 
mainly because of uncertainty and asymmetric information between policymakers and private 
economic agents about future inflation developments.167 In this context, the proximity of 
expectations to actual announced inflation targets is often described by the degree of 
credibility of the corresponding policy regime.168 Thus, if the announcement is considered to 
be credible, it should stabilize inflation around the announced target (𝐸(𝜋𝑡) = 𝜋𝑡∗) and 
consequently neglect the inflation bias, which arises under less credible discretionary 
monetary policy regimes.169 
Empirical evidence for the implicit assumption that inflation targeting coupled with 
central bank independence can provide a nominal anchor for inflation expectations have been 
presented by various economic researchers. For example, Levin, Natalucci and Piger 
demonstrated that private sector inflation forecasts in non-inflation targeting policy regimes, 
such as the U.S. (before it established inflation targeting as a monetary policy approach), are 
strongly correlated with a three-year moving average of lagged inflation. Contrarily, this 
correlation is close to zero for private sector inflation forecast in a variety of inflation 
targeting policy regimes, indicating that inflation targeting central banks have been successful 
in delinking expectations from realized inflation.170 Fujiwara analyzed if economic forecasts 
published by the central bank of Japan affects expectations of professional forecasters. He 
concludes that published forecasts have a notable effect on professional external forecasts in 
Japan, as public forecasts seem to reduce the variance of private sector forecasts. This in turn, 
indicates a reduction in forecast uncertainty.171 Crowe and Crowe and Meade find further 
                                                 
165 Svensson (2010). p. 3 
166 Leiderman and Svensson (1995). p. 1; Bernake, et al. (1999). p. 1 
167 Melecký, Palenzuela and Söderström (2008). p. 372 
168 Svensson (2010). p. 3 
169 Melecký, Palenzuela and Söderström (2008). p. 372 
170 Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004). p. 51 
171 Fujiwara (2005). p. 256 
   - 42 - 
 
 
evidence that enhanced transparency of inflation targeting central banks affect private sector 
expectations. According to both studies, inflation targeting is associated with a convergence 
in private sector forecast errors, indicating that economic forecasts published by central banks 
indeed provide a nominal anchor for private agents.172 Similar findings are reported by 
Ehrmann, Eiiffinger and Fratzscher who find a significant reduction in forecast disagreements 
and a convergence of inflation expectations of private agents within inflation targeting policy 
regimes. However, Ehrmann, Eiiffinger and Fratzscher further argue that the marginal benefit 
associated with transparency decreases once the central bank has achieved a certain level of 
credibility.173 A similar conclusion is reached by Mishkin, who argues that even though 
transparency is a virtue, it can go too far. Some extreme actions of transparency, for instance 
the publication of a central banks’ exact objective function or of the policy instrument 
projection path, can do more harm than good. Those actions can not only greatly complicate 
the communication with the general public due to time varying projection paths but also 
weaken central banks’ credibility if policymakers deviate from the announced paths. This, 
amongst other, can greatly reduce the desired flexibility accompanying inflation targeting.174 
Lastly, Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson as well as Gürkaynak et al. findings further 
strengthen the expectation anchoring capability of inflation targeting regimes. They 
illustrated that long-term inflation expectations respond to a lesser extent to economic news if 
the monetary policy is conducted under an independent inflation targeting central bank, when 
compared to countries where the central bank does not follow an inflation targeting policy 
strategy.175  
Another desired, direct consequence of inflation targeting is a significant 
enhancement of central banks’ accountability. Whereas a majority of monetary authorities 
seem to have favored opacity to actively avoid accountability for their actions, inflation 
targeting is subject to a high degree of accountability. Policymakers can be evaluated based 
on their performance of achieving pre-announced targets. Thus they are exposed to a 
considered amount of public scrutiny. This extensive accountability is an important part of 
inflation targeting as it provides incentives for policymakers to achieve their communicated 
objectives. By holding on to preannounced targets, monetary authorities maintain credibility 
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and do not fall into the time inconsistency trap of discretionary monetary policy of optimizing 
short run policy objectives. 
Due to the importance of accountability in inflation targeting policy regimes, several 
central banks are subject to even more explicit requirements to foster accountability. For 
instance, the New Zealand government is bound by a “Policy Target Agreement” which 
clearly states its responsibilities with regards to monetary policies. Moreover, the U.K. 
central bank has to publish a public statement, explaining any deviations from targets in 
excess of one percent and the actions it is taking or will take to eliminate those deviations. 
Lastly, in several other countries, policymakers have to regularly attend public hearings in the 
corresponding parliaments, where monetary policy decisions are subject to further detailed 
analysis.176 All of these precautionary measures strongly emphasize the importance of policy 
accountability within inflation targeting policy regimes.  
  
2.4.3. Optimal Policy Choice under Inflation Targeting 
After establishing a general definition of inflation targeting and manifesting the most 
important characteristics of this monetary policy strategy, the question remains how central 
banks operationalize the inflation targeting policy and adjust their instruments accordingly, 
with respect to their objective of minimizing the respective intertemporal loss  
function (18).177 As a detailed analysis of the optimal policy choice under inflation targeting 
would exceed the scope of this thesis, only a brief overview of possible considerations 
monetary authorities have to take into account will be provided. 
As explained previously, a variety of theoretical and empirical papers have stressed 
the importance of forward-looking policies, since monetary policy actions influence the 
economy with a significant time lag. Realized inflation and output are primarily a result of 
past investment and consumption decisions of both private firms and households. This 
implies that forecasts variables have to enter the respective loss function and effectively 
become intermediate target variables.178 An efficient monetary policy should thus be 
proactive. It should react to the underlying determinants of these forecasts variables in order 
to affect them in the desired way, in which 
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∗           (19) 
 
where the four-quarter inflation rate at the forecast time horizon h is equal to the desired 
target rate of inflation. However, an important issue arising from this assumption is that there 
exists theoretically an infinitum of monetary policy instrument settings which satisfy 
equation (19). As long as the time horizon h represents a number greater than the minimum 
time lag under which the corresponding, implied instrument paths affect the intermediate 
target variables, generally no unique optimal policy setting can be found.179 In this case, a 
variety of different interest rate paths will typically lead to the specified inflation target.180 
Furthermore, consider alternative forecasts of inflation and output at time t for various time 
horizons h, 
 
 𝜋𝑡 = {𝜋𝑡+ℎ,𝑡}ℎ=0
∞






          (21) 
 
in which the policy instrument affects the target variables. The respective forecasts are 





          (22) 
 
as well as on the policymakers imperfect information set at time t, 𝐼𝑡 and their judgments 
about the potential economic effects and transmissions of their decisions at time t, 𝑍𝑡. That is, 
 
𝜋𝑡+ℎ,𝑡 = 𝐸{𝜋𝑡+ℎ,|𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑡, 𝑍𝑡}ℎ=0
∞
         (23) 
 
and 
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𝛾𝑡+ℎ,𝑡 = 𝐸{𝛾𝑡+ℎ,|𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑡, 𝑍𝑡}ℎ=0
∞
         (24) 
 
Depending on the monetary forecast assumptions of monetary policy authorities, their 
information sets 𝐼𝑡 and judgments 𝑍𝑡, the policymakers should identify the combination of 
forecasts for 𝜋𝑡, 𝛾𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 that would lead to a minimization of the intertemporal loss function 
and then adjust the instrument in each period t accordingly. This process will result in the 
following endogenous reaction function for the prevailing instrument rate plan. 
 
𝐹(𝐼𝑡, 𝑍𝑡).           (25) 
 
The projection plan of all feasible options captured by the endogenous reaction 
function, however, is subject to a considerable amount of subjective judgements, to partial 
information about the actual state of the economy as well as to various assumptions about the 
main transmission mechanisms. The set of all feasible policy projections is thus considerably 
large and contains several alternatives to choose from.181 Some practitioners and academics 
argue that there is a need for further explicit conditions on the path of possible future 
instrument developments, and postulate a concept known as constant interest rate inflation 
forecast targeting.182 Nevertheless, others favor a time varying instrument rate path given by 
market expectation of future instrument rates or a majority voting about optimal instrument 
paths under different economic projections.183 As the corresponding debate has captured 
considerable attention from both academics and practitioners alike, it will be further 
elaborated in the next sub-section. 
 
2.4.3.1.  Constant and Time Varying Internal Instrument Rate Path Forecasts 
The internal decision making process of how to forecast certain target variables and 
decide on certain projections has attracted a considerable amount of attention. Several central 
banks and academics have viewed different ways to restrict the universe of potential 
instrument settings and to make optimal monetary policy decisions under various restrictions, 
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without reaching a real consensus over the optimal settings.184 One possibility to further 
narrow down the set of all feasible policy options under inflation targeting and to determine a 
potentially optimal forecast and instrument rate plan is to impose certain additional 
requirements on the future development of the chosen instrument. A potential measurement, 
which has arguably been implemented for some time by the Bank of England, the Fed and the 
Riksbank is to demand a constancy assumption on the interest rate instrument over the time 
horizon of the forward-looking policy.185 Empirical evidence for a constancy assumption on 
historical interest rate forecasts has been provided by Berg, Jansson and Vreding for Sweden, 
by Boivin for the U.S. and by Lomax for the U.K.186  
Within this framework, monetary authorities compute forecasts of inflation and output 
developments for the respective time horizon for various constant interest rate levels. The 
interest rate is then set to a level that is consistent with the h periods ahead desired inflation 
forecast, which will eventually converge into the inflation target level. This strategy responds 
systematically to the state of the economy and is commonly referred to as constant interest 
rate inflation forecast targeting. It can be denoted as:  
𝜋𝑡+ℎ|𝑡 (𝑖𝑡) = 𝜋
∗ . 187          (26) 
A general approach of how constant interest rate inflation forecast targeting is 
conducted in the U.K. is well explained by Goodhart: “When I was a member of the MPC I 
thought that I was trying, at each forecast round, to set the level of interest rates so that, 
without the need for future rate changes, prospective (forecast) inflation would on average 
equal the target at the policy.”188 A slightly different practical approach is illustrated by 
Honkapohja and Mitra for the Swedish Riksbank: “... if the overall picture of inflation 
prospects (based on an unchanged repo rate) indicates that in twelve to twenty-four months’ 
time inflation will deviate from the target, then the repo rate should normally be adjusted 
accordingly.”189  
However, one important consideration, rarely explicitly acknowledged by inflation 
targeting policy regimes, is that constant interest rate projections are not the optimal forecast 
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of possible future interest rate developments. The optimal rationally expected instrument rate 
path within the targeting horizon is rather determined by subsequent inflation forecasts within 
the respective targeting horizon. Put simply, whenever realized inflation deviates from the 
previously projected inflation path, the instrument has to be adjusted in a way in which, if 
held constant, it would bring the inflation projection back to target. The interest rate 
instrument is not truly held constant over the whole projection time horizon h. Therefore, 
constant interest rate forecast targeting should be merely seen as a necessary assumption in 
deriving monetary policy decisions rather than an actual forecast itself.190 
Of course, there are numerous constancy assumptions that central banks could make 
to develop inflation forecasts. For instance, instead of implying a constancy assumption on 
nominal interest rates, authorities could implement a constancy assumption on real interest 
rates or determine the rate in each period by following a predefined reaction function, as for 
example New Zealand does.191 
Generally, constant interest rate inflation forecast targeting has been advocated as a 
simple approach, that is easily understood by the general public.192 However, even though 
this specific targeting rule is both simple and operational, it will most likely not be optimal.193 
According to numerous empirical findings, specifying forecasts conditional on constant 
interest rate forecasts will most likely lead to various issues and policy inconsistencies. Most 
prominently, a constancy assumption on the interest rate instrument for a longer time horizon 
could lead to Wicksellian Instability, in which inflation veers off its target rather than 
approaching it.194 Moreover, Goodhart points out that generally, market expectations of 
interest rates resemble a time varying rather than constant paths. The money market yield 
curve, which can be used in deriving a proxy for market expectations of interest rate 
developments, is rarely approximately flat during the projection period.195 Consequently, as 
the constant interest rate does not mirror the best forecast for actual future interest rate 
developments, the corresponding inflation and output gap forecast will very unlikely be the 
optimal forecasts of future realized outcomes. Thus, a constancy assumption would impede 
the accuracy of simple rules in retrospect. This, in turn, makes it not only harder to compare 
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the optimal forecast under constancy assumptions with actual outcomes, but also makes the 
comparison less relevant.196 
An alternative forecast model, which was implemented by the Bank of England in 
2004, is to set the interest rate instrument conditional on the estimated future interest rate path 
implied in the money market yield curve. Taking the assumption of rational expectations and 
efficient markets into consideration, the market forecast itself is ought to be credible, while 
policymakers do not need to publicly commit to any specific constraints. By following such 
an approach, policzymakers have got another policy instrument, namely their separate ability 
to influence future interest rate expectations independently. If the inflation targeting policy 
regime appears to be credible, then the publication of the corresponding deviation should 
leeway market participant expectations in the desired direction.  
On the other hand, Goodhart points out that influencing market expectations is not a 
policy instrument that monetary authorities can vary at will. If policymakers were ever 
suspected of manipulating forecast to achieve short-term gains, they would lose all credibility 
and again fall into the time inconsistency trap of discretionary monetary policy.197 Moreover, 
basing the interest rate instrument conditional on market expectations seems to have a 
number of further disadvantages. For instance, if the deviation of realized inflation from its 
target is considerably large or the deviation is continuously worsening, it would raise severe 
concerns why no preventive policy action was taken. On the other hand, if monetary 
authorities initiates actions that have not been anticipated by private agents, while normally 
basing their instrument conditional on money market yield curve, it will most likely affect 
future private agent’s estimations of interest rates. This, amongst other, could lead to 
distortion of the market yield curve and a potential loss of credibility.198 Additionally, 
numerous academic researchers pointed out that the money market yield curve is itself a poor 
predictor of future interest rate developments, especially for longer time horizons. Rudebusch 
and Goodhart both provide empirical evidence for large root mean squared errors in the 
implied interest rate forecast for the U.S.199 Thorton provides similar findings for Japan.200 
 Lastly, Svensson strongly advocates a median consensus instrument rate plan. 
According to this strategy, each member of the monetary policy committee (MPC) should 
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plot his/her preferred instrument plan settings on an aggregated plot graph. The chosen 
instrument rate plan represents the median instrument settings for each future quarter under 
discussion. Forecasts of inflation and output gaps are then estimated conditional on the 
agreed on policy. Hence, the corresponding results could be interpreted as some kind of 
majority voting procedure. According to Svensson, the combined outcome of inflation, output 
gap and interest rate plan would represent the best forecast of economic target variables, 
conditional on the information set available and the authorities’ personal judgement, without 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
While most monetary authorities and central banks have already been in place since 
the seventeenth century, their general objectives, functions and operations have undoubtedly 
evolved over their prevailing time horizons. Especially over the past decades the fast pace of 
new reforms and newly introduced monetary policy approaches have been remarkably visible 
around the globe. The aforesaid phenomena of the realization of time inconsistency issues, 
the benefits of independence and transparency and various extensions and analyses of 
monetary policy rules have significantly contributed to the rising understanding of macro-
economic policy effects.202 One aspect, which particularly stands out, is the rising level of 
transparency of most central banks. While for most of their existing time central banks have 
followed the conventional wisdom that “silence is golden”, a recent consensus has emerged 
that central banks should operate under more transparent frameworks. Therefore, central 
banks should reveal policy-relevant information, unless there exists a justifiable reason for 
not disclosing them.203 This perspective is partly supported by Greenspan who noted that 
“openness is an obligation of a central bank in a free and democratic society.” However, 
Greenspan additionally pointed out that even though transparency is a desirable state, the 
most effective policymaking is conducted in absence of the immediate glare of the public.204  
Mainly due to the rise of inflation targeting policy regimes and the corresponding rise 
of transparency, central banks have started to increase their communication with the general 
public. Most of today’s inflation targeting policy regimes disclose their inflation forecasts 
and output forecasts, normally with uncertainty bands, on which they base their monetary 
policy decisions on, in so-called Inflation Reports (with the exception of the Bank of Israel 
and the Central Bank of Turkey). Despite the increasing efforts towards a higher degree of 
policy transparency, only a limited number of central banks publish their interest rate 
projection path. Furthermore, not a single central bank publishes its exact objective function, 
nor their exact quantitative reasoning for specific policy decisions.205 
Generally speaking, monetary policymaking is a highly complex, nonlinear process 
based on partly temporary relationship among economic variables. However, for both 
descriptive and prescriptive reasoning, economists are looking for simplified character-
                                                 
202 Mishkin (2004). p. 48 
203 Faust and Leeper (2005). p. 1 
204 See Greenspan (2002). p. 933-934 
205 Mishkin (2004). p. 47 
   - 51 - 
 
 
izations of this nonlinear policymaking process. Thus, numerous academic and independent 
researchers have proposed different, simplified policy evaluation rules. One of the most 
prominent and most widely used simplifications is the previously discussed Taylor Rule and 
its suggested morphologies.  
This section tries to answer the question whether economic forecasts published by 
inflation targeting central banks are consistent with their monetary policy decisions today. 
More precisely, this section evaluates if monetary policy decisions today incorporate a pre-
emptive perspective of these economic forecasts. Therefore, it is empirically analyzed 
whether adjustments to the interest rate instrument can be characterized by reduced 
information policy simplifications of forward-looking, mostly linear Taylor-type Rules and 
even more important if these adjustments are consistent with the inherit Taylor Principle, 
proposedly necessary for economic stability. Moreover, as a direct response to the financial 
crisis in 2008 and later due to the European sovereign debt crisis, numerous central banks 
engaged into excessive expansionary policy behavior. Thus, various monetary authorities 
have effectively hit the zero lower bound on their policy interest rate instrument, which 
severely limited its further use. Thus, another important question arises. Can a change in 
policy behavior, pre- and post-crisis, within the central banks under analysis be observed? 
For simplicity, the empirical part focusses on a limited sample of inflation targeting central 
banks. In order to assess whether inflation targeting central bank’ forecasts are generally 
consistent with the Taylor Principle and if central banks responds differently to these 
forecasts pre- and post-financial crisis, the analysis will be based on forecast data of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Sveriges Riksbank and the U.S. Fed. By analyzing these 
three central banks, the analysis comprises three diverse geographical and political areas. 
 
3.1. Methodological Notes 
Since the initial introduction of Taylor’s seminal paper “Discretion versus policy rules 
in practice”, it has become common practice to describe interest rate setting behavior of most 
monetary authorities in terms of monetary policy reaction functions. Moreover, various 
academic research has focused on modifications of Taylor’s initially proposed reaction 
function with the goal of increasing its explanatory power of describing monetary policy 
behavior, while still holding on to its elegant simplicity. These rules, which are still in the 
spirit of the initial Taylor Rule are, as aforementioned, in the literature commonly referred to 
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as Taylor-Type Rules.206 With regards to the empirical analysis of monetary policy behavior, 
various Taylor Rules and Taylor-type Rules that are based on published economic forecasts 
by the central banks under analysis will be compared. For the empirical research in section 
3.4., Taylor’s initially proposed reaction function with estimated coefficients based on 
published central bank forecasts is used. The Taylor-type Rule, as described in section 2.3.2, 
will then be analyzed for zero, one and two years forecast horizons and can be denoted as: 
 
𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑟∗ +  𝜋𝑡+ℎ + βπ ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + βy ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦
∗)    (27) 
 
where    
h represents the respective forecasted time horizons under analysis, namely 
0,1 and 2 years. 
 
Following the derived specification of Rudebusch and Clarida et al., a Taylor-Type 
morphology, which incorporates an interest rate smoothing term with a forward-looking 
character, will be analyzed as well. The adaptation of an interest rate smoothing term is based 
on the numerous empirical findings, which state that central banks adjust policy instruments 
in small, gradual manners rather than changing it instantaneously towards the recommended 
target level.207 Moreover, as indicated by the graphical illustration of the policy rate 
developments in section 3.3.1. and the corresponding unit root tests, all policy rate time series 
seem to inherit a structural break post-financial crisis in 2007/2008. To account for the 
possibility of a structural break in the dependent variable, a dummy for a changing intercept 
will be integrated into the corresponding Taylor Rule morphology. Following the reasoning 
of section 2.3.2., while also incorporating a dummy variable for a possible time break into the 
proposed reaction function, the forward-looking Taylor-type Rule takes on the following 
shape:\  
      
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∗ (𝑟
∗ +  𝜋𝑡+ℎ + βπ ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + βy ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦
∗) + 𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘) +
𝜌 ∗ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑡( 𝑡+ℎ
𝑖 )          (28) 
 
                                                 
206 Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke (2008). p. 2. – For a detailed explanation of Taylor-type Rules, please refer to 
section 2.3. 
207 Rudebusch (1995). p. 271; Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). p. 153 – For a more detailed description of 
interest rate smoothing behavior of monetary authorities, please refer to section 2.3.1. 
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where    
h represents the respective forecasted time horizons under analysis, namely 
0,1 and 2 year, 
𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 represents a dummy variable for a changing constant post-
financial crisis. 
 
Lastly, as aforementioned, various central banks around the globe effectively reached 
the zero lower bound on their interest rate policy instrument. Consequently, its applicability 
for further expansionary policy decisions was severely limited and monetary policy 
authorities had to recourse to other policy instruments instead, such as the monetary supply 
instrument. For instance, in effort to fight, what turned out to be the worst recession since 
1937 in the U.S., the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cut the policy rate to almost 
zero, facing the danger of a liquidity trap. During this temporary, unconventional economic 
state, monetary authorities were restrained from using their normal policy instrument and had 
to rely on other policy instruments. Thus, as a response to the severe recession, several 
central banks, for instance the ECB or the Fed, engaged into the so-called unconventional 
quantitative easing programs. In short, such a monetary strategy refers to the large scale 
purchase of longer-term government securities to induce large amounts of liquidity into the 
market and stimulate the economy as well as to reduce persisting term premiums along the 
yield curve due to imperfect market arbitrage.208 
To factor in the important possibility of changing coefficients due to a restricted use 
of the ordinary monetary policy interest rate instruments or due to changing policy behavior 
as a necessary response to the unconventional time, a third reaction function with changing 
coefficients will be estimated for the aforesaid time horizons. Following this approach, the 
corresponding equation will incorporate dynamic dummy variables for all coefficients and 
will hence take on the following shape: 
             
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∗ (𝑟
∗ +  𝜋𝑡+ℎ + βπ ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + βy ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦
∗) + 𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 +
𝛿𝜋 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + 𝛿𝛾 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝛾𝑡+ℎ −  𝛾
∗)) +
𝜌 ∗ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑡( 𝑡+ℎ
𝑖 )          (29) 
 
                                                 
208 Blinder (2010). p. 465-467 
   - 54 - 
 
 
where    
h represents the corresponding forecasted time horizons under analysis, 
namely 0,1 and 2 years, 
𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 represents a dummy variable for a changing constant post- 
financial crisis, 
𝛿𝜋 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) represents a dynamic dummy variable for a changing 
policy behavior in response to inflation deviations from targe, 
𝛿𝛾 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) represents a dynamic dummy variable for a changing 
policy behavior in response to output deviations from potential, optimal target 
levels 
 
Equation (27), (28) and (29) represent the basis for different models under analysis. 
However, in order to be assessable by an OLS regression, slight modifications are necessary. 
For illustration purposes, the modifications will be emphasized on equation (29) and be partly 
based on the explanation of Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke and Calarida, Gali and Gertler. Firstly, 
the long term real equilibrium interest rate 𝑟∗ is not directly observable. However, consistent 
with Calarida, Gali and Gertler, it can be treated as time-invariant and therefore be 
aggregated into the constant 𝜃 with a possible structural break post-financial crisis, captured 
by 𝛿𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘. Furthermore, 𝛽𝜋∗  can be interpreted as (1 + 𝛽𝜋). Thus, using 𝛽𝜋∗  as the 
coefficient for the inflation targeting gap, the Taylor Principle holds if 𝛽𝜋∗  > 1.
209 Moreover, 
one of the most difficult variables to quantify in a Taylor-type Rule framework is the 
estimation of the potential output forecasts. In order to obtain estimates of the potential 
outputs for the respective forecasts horizon, a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter (HPF) with the 
smoothing parameter set at 𝜏 = 1600 is applied on the respective GDP growth forecasts. The 
HPF follows the succeeding shape: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝜏𝑡}𝑡=1𝑇
[∑ (𝛾𝑡 − 𝜏𝑡)




𝑡=1 ]  (30) 
 
where 
  𝜏 is a trend component set at 1600 for quarterly data, 
  𝛾𝑡 represents the respective GDP growth forecasts.   
                                                 
209 Calarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). p. 5 
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Finally, by using the notation below, a slightly adapted Taylor-type Rule, inclusive 
interest rate smoothing term can be derived. 
 
I. 




































Following the notation above, equation (29) transforms into: 210 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + b ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + c ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝑦𝑡+ℎ − 𝑦
∗) + 𝑑 + 𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + 𝑓 ∗
𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋
∗) + 𝜌 ∗ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑡( 𝑡+ℎ
𝑖 )       
  (31) 
                                                 
210 Fendel, Frenkel and Rülke (2008). p. 10 – Following this approach the above mentioned equation can be 
estimated by OLS regressions and does not need to rely on a General Method of Moments estimation. 
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The adaptation demonstrated above is used for both equation (28) and equation (29) 
and represents the empirical basis for the following OLS estimations in section 3.3.2. 
 
3.2.    Data Description 
All data are retrieved from the corresponding central banks and represent actual real- 
time, ex-ante forecast data published in the inflation forecasts reports of the respective 
inflation targeting central banks unless otherwise indicated. Generally, these inflation 
forecasts reports are issued by the Open Market Committee (OMC) (for some countries the 
committee is also referred to as the MPC) on a quarterly basis and portray a snapshot of the 
overall development of the economy from the view of monetary authorities. The reports also 
contain future outlooks on key economic variables, such as inflation, output and 
unemployment based on current interest rate and policy projection paths of the respective 
central banks. For the U.S, the forecast data are based on staff projections of the Federal 
Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) historical transcript materials prior to the publication of 
the official Monetary Policy Reports in 2012. In detail, the used economic forecast data 
represents zero, one and two years, quarter on quarter ex ante forecast data for inflation and 
GDP growth estimates. Furthermore, the policy rates correspond to real time policy rates at 
time t+0.  
The time series for the Sveriges Riksbank starts at Q1/1996, as prior to this date 
inflation targeting reports were only issued on a trimester or semi-annual basis. The time 
series for the U.S. Fed follows this time span and starts at Q1/1996 as well. However, as the 
Fed seems to publish two-year output forecasts only on a semi-annual basis prior to Q1/2012 
(first publication of official monetary policy reports), the following analysis for the monetary 
policy of the Fed will only take one-year forecasts into consideration. Lastly, the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand only started to use a short-term interest rate instrument, namely the so-
called Official Cash Rate (OCR), as their main policy instrument since Q1/1999. Prior to this 
date New Zealand relied on other policy instrument. Therefore, the overall analysis for the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand will be based on a slightly smaller sample. 
The following sections briefly describe and analyze the data used in the empirical 
analysis in descriptive terms. Moreover, graphical illustrations for all dependent variable 
developments can be found in Appendix IV.II to IV.V. 
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3.2.1. Dependent Variable – Policy Interest Rate 
The main monetary policy instruments through with monetary policy decisions are 
implemented in Sweden, New Zealand and the U.S. are the repo rate, the OCR and the 
effective federal fund rate. Thus, these rates will serve as the independent variables in the 
empirical analysis in section 3.5.  
Generally speaking, the repo rate and OCR are short-term interest rates and represent the 
general price levels at which depository institutions can shortly borrow or deposit funds at the 
corresponding central banks on an uncollateralized basis.211 Furthermore, the effective federal 
fund rate represents the weighted average rate at which depository institutions trade their 
excess funds overnight on an uncollateralized basis in order to balance their accounts. Even 
though the effective federal fund rate is directly determined by the market, it is influenced by 
the Fed towards the desired target level through its open market operations, namely by selling 
or buying short-term government bonds.212  
A brief descriptive analysis of the policy interest rate data reveals no real surprises. 
Analyzing the quarterly time horizon from Q1/1996 to Q2/2017 and Q1/1999 to Q2/2017 for 
Sweden, the U.S. and New Zealand grants 86 and 74 observations, respectively. Moreover, 
the average policy interest rate is highest in New Zealand and amounts to 4.56% compared to 
2.27% and 2.42% in Sweden and the U.S. The skewness is positive in the case of New 
Zealand and the U.S., however, negative in the case of Sweden. This phenomenon can mainly 
be attributable to recent negative policy rates of c. -0.5% (minimum value), implemented by 
the Swedish Riksbank. Contrarily, the minimum values for the policy rates are positive in the 
case of New Zealand and the U.S., and amount to 1.75% and 0.07%, respectively. A negative 
kurtosis in all cases indicate platykurtotic distributions with less frequent extreme policy 
adjustments. Combined with a high degree of first order autocorrelation of 0.70 to 0.83, it 
could be seen as a reasonable indicator for the aforementioned phenomena of interest rate 
smoothing and policy inertia of central banks. Lastly, a calculated Jarque-Bera-Test (JB Test) 
rejects the null-hypothesis of a normal distribution in all cases at the 5% significance level. 
The following table provides a brief summary about the descriptive statistics for the monetary 
policy rates  
                                                 
211 Riksbank (2017) - http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/Explanation-of-the-
series/Riksbank-interest-rates/ (23/10/2017) 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2017) - https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/about-monetary-policy/what-
is-the-official-cash-rate (23/10/2017) 
212 FRED (2017) - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS (23/10/2017) 
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The descriptive summary is calculated for the time horizon from Q1/1996 to Q2/2017 for Sweden and the U.S. 
and for the time horizon Q1/1999 to Q2/2017 for New Zealand. All values correspond to percentage values. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics calculations for policy instruments  
 
Furthermore, the following graph illustrates the development of the policy rate paths 
during the time horizon under consideration.  
 
 
Figure 3: Policy interest rate development in Sweden, New Zealand and the U.S.  
 Policy Interest Rates Sweden New Zealand United States
Nr. of Observations 86 74 86
Average 2.27 4.56 2.42
Standard Deviation 1.62 2.03 2.30
Skewness -0.29 0.28 0.40
Excess Kurtosis -1.29 -1.32 -1.56
JB-test Statistics 7.17 6.33 10.97
p-value 0.03 0.04 0.00
Max 4.54 8.25 6.53
0.90 Percentile 4.10 7.25 5.50
0.75 Percentile 3.80 6.44 5.16
Median 2.18 4.63 1.67
0.25 Percentile 1.00 2.50 0.16
0.10 Percentile -0.18 2.50 0.11
Min -0.50 1.75 0.07
Autoregression (-1) 0.81 0.83 0.70












Q1/96 Q1/98 Q1/00 Q1/02 Q1/04 Q1/06 Q1/08 Q1/10 Q1/12 Q1/14 Q1/16
Repo Rate Sweden Official Cash Rate New Zealand Federal Fund Rate U.S.
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When evaluating the graphical illustration of the policy rates, four distinct features 
stand out. Firstly, the policy rates seem to partly follow the same underlying trend, resulting 
in significant co-movements across time. This apparently linear relationship is partly 
confirmed by the following correlation matrix.  
The correlation matrix is calculated on historical data from Q1/1999 to Q2/2017 for New Zealand and Sweden 
and New Zealand and the U.S.. The correlation analysis between Sweden and the U.S. is based on historical 
instrument data between Q1/1996 and Q2/2017. 
 
Table 3: Policy interest rate correlation matrix 
 
All policy rates inherit a correlation between 0.70 and 0.76, with the highest, 
observable correlation between the policy interest rate instruments of New Zealand and of the 
U.S. The global synchronization of interest rates is in macroeconomics a widely discussed 
phenomenon and has been confirmed by various academic research. Byrne, Fazio and Fiess, 
among others, attributed this circumstance to the rise of global business cycles, the 
convergence of global monetary policy and the global savings glut.213  
Secondly, the policy rates seem to partly follow consistent, gradual changes towards a 
specific target level rather than being completely adjusted every quarter. The observation 
confirms the high level of first order autocorrelation. Moreover, the direction of the interest 
rate seems to be only infrequently reversed. This phenomenon, which is widely referred to as 
interet rate smoothing or policy inertia, has been extensively discussed in modern literature. 
A small selection of published findings comprises Lowe and Ellis, who presented strong 
evidence for interest rate smoothing behaviors of central banks in Australia, Japan, Germany 
and the U.K., Judd and Rudebusch and Calarida, Gali and Gertler, who provided policy 
inertia findings for the U.S. and Goodhart who presented evidence for similar observations in 
France, Italy, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Austria.214  
                                                 
213 Byrne, Fazio and Fiess (2012). p. 184 
214 Lowe and Ellis (1998). p. 308; Calarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). p. 10; Judd, and Rudebusch (1998). p. 6; 
Goodhart (1997). p. 168  
Correlation Matrix Sweden New Zealand United States
Sweden 1.00
New Zealand 0.75 1.00
United States 0.70 0.76 1.00
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Thirdly, all policy rates seem to be subject to a sudden, excessive decline between 
2007 and 2009 as a direct response to the financial crisis. Sweden reduced its policy rate by 
2.1% between Q3/2008 and Q4/2008 as a response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and in 
total by more than 4% between Q3/2008 and Q3/2009, hitting temporary the zero lower 
bound. The Fed reacted slightly earlier to the signs of an upcoming financial crisis and 
already reduced the effective fund rate by 1.6% between Q4/2007 and Q1/2008. Another 
dramatic reduction of c. 1.7% followed as a direct consequence to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, pushing the effective fund rate towards the zero lower bound, where it stayed for 
almost seven years. Similar behavior was observed in New Zealand, although the OCR did 
not reach the zero lower bound. Nevertheless, New Zealand’s monetary authorities followed 
an extraordinary cut in policy rates of 2.3% between Q3/2008 and Q4/2008. In total, New 
Zealand’s monetary authorities initiated a historical high contraction in policy rate of c. 5.8% 
between Q2/2008 and Q2/2009. 
Taking the financial crisis 2007/2008 and the occurrence of the zero lower bound into 
account, the policy interest rates do not seem to comprise a continuous trend during the entire 
observation period, but rather seem to follow different trends pre- and post-crisis. Whereas 
sufficient variations in the policy rates are observable pre-crisis, only small changes were 
initiated post-crisis, especially in the case of New Zealand and the U.S. In order to test for a 
non-stationary process, a Phillips-Perron test is applied to test for stationary breaks. 
The Phillips Perron test is calculated on data ranging from Q1/1996 to Q2/2017 for Sweden and the U.S. and 
from Q1/1999 to Q2/2017 for New Zealand. 
 
Table 4: Phillips-Perron Test for unit root 















Riks Bank - Z(t) -0.934 -19.53 -13.58 -10.91 0.901 86 3
Riks Bank - Z(rho) -0.453 -3.531 -2.902 -2.586 0.901 86 3
Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand - Z(t)
-9.729 -19.833 -13.7 -11.013 0.089 74 4
Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand - Z(rho)
-2.62 -3.507 -2.889 -2.579 0.089 74 4
Federal Reserve Bank 
U.S.
-7.142 -19,833 -13.720 -11.013 0.1862 86 4
Federal Reserve Bank 
U.S. -2.257 -3.507 -2.889 -2.579 0.1862 86 4
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The Phillips-Perron test confirms the initial assumptions of structural breaks in the 
dependent variables. The H0 hypothesis, which indicates that the time series variable is non-
stationary and possesses a unit root, cannot be rejected for Sweden and the U.S. and can only 
be rejected at the 10% significance level for New Zealand. Hence, the conducted test further 
strengthens the necessity of implementing a structural break post-crisis. 
Lastly, a clear violation of the zero lower bound appears to be the case in Sweden since 
Q1/2015. The corresponding policy rate crossed the zero lower bound and is denoted at -
0.5% as of Q2/2017. This phenomenon presents a clear anomaly to the previous assumed 
limit of how much interest rates could be cut. According to monetary authorities of the 
Swedish Riksbank, unconventional monetary policy measures were necessary to remain 
extremely expansionary and to provide sufficient economic stimulus to keep inflation close to 
the 2% target. Thus, the unconventional, temporary measure of breaking the zero-interest rate 
floor was decided on.215 However, Sweden is not the only central bank embarking on so-
called negative policy rates. While inflation appears to be still below target in many 
economies, even after moving policy rates close to the zero lower bound and initiating large-
scale asset purchase programs, several central banks broke effectively the zero lower bound 
(e.g. Denmark in 2014, ECB in 2015 etc.)  
As the emergence of negative policy rates is a relatively new phenomenon in 
macroeconomics, the experience with it is rather limited. Nevertheless, an initial study of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated first positive effects on the economy, while 
elaborating on potential limits of extreme negative policy adjustments. For instance, when 
policy rates approach a threshold at which agents switch to holding cash rather than holding 
on to a deposit, further cuts will most likely be ineffective. Hence, negative policy rate 
decisions should be complemented by other monetary policy strategies to gain efficient 
economic stimulus and to move rates above the zero lower bound once again.216 However, to 
predict an exact effect of negative policy rates on banks, asset prices, transmission 
mechanism and private agents behaviors, which are most likely different from positive rate 
territory effects due to the existence of physical cash holding, a more extensive research is 
required. As further research the phenomenon would exceed the initial scope of this thesis, 
the corresponding analysis of negative rate effects is left for further research 
                                                 
215 Swedish Riksbank (2015). p. 8 
216 IMF (2017). p. 1 
   - 62 - 
 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables – CPI & GDP Growth (Forecasts) 
The following part briefly describes inflation targeting central banks’ ex ante forecasts 
of CPI and GDP in descriptive terms, across the entire sample period. Noticeably, the average 
one- and two-year ex ante inflation forecasts, across the entire sample, are remarkably similar 
to the realized levels of inflation for the U.S. and New Zealand (0.0% - 0.1 % difference), 
however differ significantly for the Swedish Riksbank (0.6% - 1.3% difference), as illustrated 
in table 5. This phenomenon could partly be attributed to the fact that Sweden was also 
exposed to the European sovereign debt crisis, due to the geographical proximity in addition 
to the financial crisis in 2008. Two severe recession, with temporary deflation within five to 
six years were the dramatic consequence. However, the corresponding forecasts seem not to 
accurately predict the extreme reaction to the proposed economic shocks. This hypothesis can 
partly be confirmed by comparing the minimum inflation forecasts values to the minimum 
realized inflation values. The difference between minimum realized and minimum forecast 
value amounts to -2.8% for the Swedish Riksbank, whereas, the difference in minimum 
forecast and minimum realized inflation amounts to only -1.2% for New Zealand and -0.9% 
for the U.S.217 Moreover, the standard deviation of the entire forecast samples appears to be 
significantly lower when compared to the actual realized CPI for all central banks. This 
indicates that realized inflation appears to be much more volatile around the mean than 
projected by monetary policy authorities’ forecasts. This observation is further supported by 
the larger spread between the realized minimum and maximum inflation value when 
compared to the corresponding forecasts for all cases. This, in turn, could be partly attributed 
to the fact that central banks derive their economic forecasts based on their policy projection 
path. Thus, the policy projection path should correspond to a value, which ensures that the 
desired target levels for price and output stabilization are reached in the medium-term. 
However, as monetary authorities base their decisions on an incomplete information set, their 
economic projections are subject to a high degree of uncertainty, normally captured by 
uncertainty bands. As the provided data is based on median values within the uncertainty 
area, it appears to inherit much less volatility. Similar observations can be made with regard 
to GDP growth (forecasts). Finally, the JB-Test rejects the null hypothesis for a normal 
distribution in all cases, for both CPI and GDP growth (forecasts) at the 5% significance 
level. 
                                                 
217 The values are calculated by subtracting the minimum forecasts value of inflation from the minimum realized 
inflation value. 
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The descriptive statistics are calculated on the data set for the time horizon from Q1/1996 to Q2/2017 for Sweden and the U.S. and from Q1/1999 to 
 Q2/2017 for New Zealand. All values, with the exception of the JB-test statistic and the Autoregression correspond to percentage values. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive summary of realized CPI and CPI forecasts 
 
 
Sweden x New Zealand x United States
CPI (Forecasts) +0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +0 Year +1 Year +2 Year 
Nr. of Observations 86 86 86 74 74 74 86 86 86
Average 1.13 1.75 2.37 2.15 2.30 2.34 2.20 2.15 2.17
Standard Deviation 1.19 0.51 0.47 1.20 0.65 0.34 1.24 0.77 0.67
Skewness 0.44 0.88 0.42 0.51 0.10 -0.25 -0.36 -0.63 -0.02
Excess Kurtosis 0.17 0.58 0.50 -0.18 -0.60 -0.53 0.71 0.65 -0.75
JB-test Statistics 2.87 12.22 3.44 3.27 1.22 1.61 3.63 7.12 2.04
p-value 0.24 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.54 0.45 0.16 0.03 0.36
Max 4.37 3.42 3.79 5.30 3.85 3.00 5.00 3.76 3.54
0.90 Percentile 2.92 2.42 2.90 3.85 3.08 2.76 3.65 3.17 3.08
0.75 Percentile 1.82 2.07 2.69 2.98 2.76 2.60 2.98 2.72 2.71
Median 1.00 1.57 2.34 1.95 2.30 2.33 2.25 2.19 2.13
0.25 Percentile 0.22 1.38 2.04 1.33 1.90 2.17 1.50 1.76 1.68
0.10 Percentile -0.16 1.17 1.77 0.73 1.42 1.85 0.85 1.11 1.32
Min -1.87 0.86 1.30 0.10 1.09 1.63 -1.40 -0.48 0.56
Autoregression (-1) % 0.81 0.68 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.70 0.62 0.83
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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The descriptive statistics are calculated on the data set for the time horizon from Q1/1996 to Q2/2017 for Sweden and the U.S. and from Q1/1999 to Q2/2017 for 
New Zealand. All values, with the exception of the JB-test statistic and the Autoregression correspond to percentage values. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive summary of realized GDP growth and GDP growth forecast
Sweden x New Zealand x United States Policy Rate
GDP (Forecasts) +0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +0 Year +1 Year +2 Year 
Nr. of Observations 86 86 86 74 74 74 86 86 49
Average 1.32 2.57 2.78 2.72 2.33 2.49 2.40 3.73 3.68
Standard Deviation 2.37 0.82 0.42 1.61 0.69 0.43 2.53 1.54 1.30
Skewness -0.58 -0.47 0.03 -0.75 -1.76 -3.36 -1.05 0.12 0.12
Excess Kurtosis 3.32 1.03 -0.24 1.12 4.35 17.15 3.58 -1.61 -1.42
JB-test Statistics 44.40 6.97 0.21 10.74 96.49 1046.30 61.69 9.52 4.24
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.54 0.45 0.00 0.03 0.36
Max 8.00 4.47 3.70 6.00 3.33 3.10 7.80 6.60 5.80
0.90 Percentile 4.08 3.45 3.45 4.67 2.99 2.86 5.15 5.60 5.44
0.75 Percentile 2.58 3.05 3.00 3.40 2.75 2.77 3.78 5.25 4.90
Median 0.93 2.60 2.80 2.85 2.47 2.57 2.70 3.75 3.25
0.25 Percentile 0.41 2.00 2.50 2.20 2.09 2.34 1.20 2.20 2.55
0.10 Percentile -0.06 1.77 2.32 0.89 1.70 2.20 -0.20 2.00 2.10
Min -6.40 -0.16 1.62 -1.80 -0.24 -0.08 -8.20 1.50 1.40
Autoregression (-1) % 0.84 0.72 0.76 0.93 0.86 0.73 0.40 0.89 0.96
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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3.3.   An Estimate of (Forward-looking) Taylor-type Rules  
Table 7, 8 and 9 display the main results of the estimated equations (27), (28) and 
(29). Generally, the results are reasonable in magnitude and seem to explain ex-ante 
monetary policy behavior remarkably well. The significantly high R2s suggest high 
explanatory powers of the overall models and amount to values in excess of 90% for equation 
estimations (28) and (29) for all central banks under analysis. However, these high values 
have to be treated with cautions and mainly result from the large lagged interest rate 
smoothing parameters. Furthermore, the primary objective of granting sufficient evidence for 
all central banks under analysis that central banks’ inflation targeting forecasts, are consistent 
with the Taylor Principle, is accomplished, at least for the time horizon before the financial 
crisis. Post-crisis, evidence for monetary policy behavior, consistent with the Taylor Principle 
can only be provided for the Swedish Riksbank. This strongly indicates a significant shift in 
monetary policy behavior pre- and post-financial crisis, captured by the corresponding 
dynamic policy coefficients (equation (29)) for the U.S. and New Zealand. Furthermore, only 
limited output stabilization behavior can be observed in the forecast estimations for New 
Zealand and Sweden and no direct output stabilization behavior can be observed in the 
forecast estimation for the U.S. Finally, all estimations of the smoothing parameter seem to 
be extremely high, indicating a significant policy rate inertia. 
More precisely, tables 7, 8 and 9 are built on the following structure: The vertical 
headline represents the dependent policy rate variable under analysis, namely the Swedish 
repo rate, the OCR in New Zealand or the federal fund rate in the U.S. The horizontal 
headlines represent the parameters of the independent variables under analysis. From left to 
right, the parameters correspond to the realized inflation gap (t+0 year), the forecasted 
inflation gap (t+1 year) and (t+2 years), the realized bank estimate of the output gap (t+0), the 
realized output gap based on the HP filter approach conditional on realized GDP growth 
(t+0), the forecasted output gaps based on the HP filter approach conditional on the GDP 
growth forecasts for (t+1 year) and (t+2 years), the smoothing interest rate parameter р, the 
change in real interest equilibrium rate post-crisis (captured by a time break in the constant), 
a dynamic coefficient capturing a change in inflation gap policy post-crisis, a dynamic 
coefficient capturing a change in output gap policy post-crisis and the constant (proxy for the 
real interest equilibrium rate). R2 represents a general measure of fit for the proposed reaction 
function in comparison to realized policy rates. Finally, βπ (t+h) ≥ 1 (Taylor Principle) and βγ 
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(t+h) ≥ 0 represent strict abidance of policy rule characterizations for the respective inflation 
and output gap parameters at various time horizons, necessary for economic stability in most 
economic models. The coefficients are tested at the 99%, 95% and 90% significance level. 
Furthermore, the policy rates of the Swedish Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand and the U.S. Fed are regressed against the respective, realized inflation and output 
gaps for t+0 (bank estimate and HP filter estimate) as well as against the inflation and output 
gaps forecasts for t+1 year and t+2 years in regressions x.1 to x.4 (equation (27) estimations). 
Following the observations of section 3.4., regressions x.5 to x.8 incorporate an interest rate 
smoothing term as well as a time break for a changing medium to long-term real interest 
equilibrium rate post-financial crisis (equation (28) estimations). Lastly, regressions x.9 to 
x.12 assimilate dynamic coefficients for a changing policy behavior in terms of price and 
output stabilization with regards to the corresponding interest rate policy instrument for all 
time horizons. The potential policy change is captured by the coefficients “Δ Inflation Gap 
Policy (Post-Crisis)” and “Δ Output Gap Policy (Post-Crisis)”, in addition to the 
modifications mentioned above. 
The graphical illustrations for all policy rules under analysis can be found in the 
corresponding appendix chapters IV.V to IV.VII. 
 
 




The regression estimations below correspond to t+h=0=1=2 (forecast) data of the Swedish Riksbank, published in their quarterly monetary policy reports and follow 
equations (27), (28) and (29), respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level for all parameters > 0. +++, ++ and + indicate significance at 
the 99%, 95% and 90% level for the strict abidance of βπ (t+h) > 1 (Taylor Principle) and βγ (t+h) > 0. 
 
Table 7: Various Taylor-type Rules based on (forecast) data of the Swedish Riksbank 















βγ  HP Filter
Output
Gap (t+1):
βγ  HP Filter
Output
Gap (t+2):








Gap Policy  
(Post Crisis)
Δ Output Gap 
Policy (Post 
Crisis)
Constant R2 βπ (t+h) > 1 βγ(t+h) > 0
(1.1) Repo Rate 0.39** 0.19** 2.65*** 0.22 - ++
(0.16) (0.09) (0.20)
(1.2) Repo Rate 0.64*** -0.11 2.83*** 0.20 - -
(0.14) (0.08) (0.20)
(1.3) Repo Rate 0.62* -0.34 2.43*** 0.03 - -
0.34 (0.23) (0.19)
(1.4) Repo Rate -2.44*** -0.16 3.17*** 0.52 - -
(0.26) (0.34) (0.16)
(1.5) Repo Rate 0.84*** 0.19 0.85*** -2.50** 3.74*** 0.97 - -
(0.34) 0.17 (0.04) (1.03) (1.11)
(1.6) Repo Rate 1.00*** 0.73*** 0.90*** -3.04*** 3.78** 0.98 - +++
(0.27) (0.15) (0.03) (1.02) (0.89)
(1.7) Repo Rate 3.73*** 2.14*** 0.92*** -4.02*** 4.23*** 0.97 +++ +++
(0.74) (0.56) (0.04) (1.33) (1.52)
(1.8) Repo Rate 0.65 -0.73 0.86*** -4.11*** 3.35*** 0.96 - -
(0.92) (0.74) (0.04) (0.98) (1.03)
(1.9) Repo Rate 0.69** 0.17 0.85*** -2.14** 0.41 0.00 3.67*** 0.97 - -
(0.29) (0.22) (0.04) (1.09) (0.45) (0.29) (0.17)
(1.10) Repo Rate 1.02*** 0.78** 0.90*** -3.08*** -0.04 -0.06 3.86*** 0.98 - ++
(0.33) (0.38) (0.03) (1.15) (0.54) (0.40) (1.28)
(1.11) Repo Rate 3.84*** 1.48* 0.93*** -4.39*** -0.71 1.71 4.28*** 0.98 +++ +
(0.96) (0.86) (0.03) (1.58) (1.99) (1.19) (1.66)
(1.12) Repo Rate 1.90 -0.19 0.87*** -3.34*** -2.09 -1.39 3.29*** 0.96 - -
(1.28) (0.89) (0.04) (1.28) (1.81) (1.66) (1.03)
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The regression estimations below correspond to t+h=0=1=2 (forecast) data of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, published in their quarterly monetary policy reports and 
follow equations (27), (28) and (29), respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level for all parameters > 0. +++, ++ and + indicate 
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level for the strict abidance of βπ (t+h) > 1 (Taylor Principle) and βγ (t+h) > 0. 
 
Table 8: Various Taylor-type Rules based on (forecast) data of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 















βγ  HP Filter
Output
Gap (t+1):
βγ  HP Filter
Output
Gap (t+2):








Gap Policy  
(Post Crisis)
Δ Output Gap 
Policy (Post 
Crisis)
Constant R2 βπ (t+h) > 1 βγ(t+h) > 0
(2.1) OCR 0.78*** 0.96*** 4.47*** 0.68 - +++
(0.11) (0.10) (0.14)
(2.2) OCR 0.87*** 0.08 4.43*** 0.25 - -
(0.18) (0.09) (0.21)
(2.3) OCR 1.89*** -0.15 3.99*** 0.35 +++ -
(0.31) (0.40) (0.21)
(2.4) OCR 2.60*** -0.24 3.69*** 0.18 +++ -
(0.66) (0.65) (0.31)
(2.5) OCR 0.25 0.65*** 0.74*** -2.94*** 5.87*** 0.97 - +++
(0.18) (0.17) (0.04) (0.57) (0.97)
(2.6) OCR 0.06 0.82*** 0.87*** -5.10*** 6.83*** 0.98 - +++
(0.31) (0.15) (0.04) (1.10) (1.87)
(2.7) OCR 0.17 3.46*** 0.85*** -4.51*** 6.49*** 0.98 - +++
(0.52) (0.56) (0.04) (0.87) (1.48)
(2.8) OCR 0.41 4.13*** 0.84*** -4.63*** 6.51*** 0.98 - +++
(0.93) (0.78) (0.04) (0.89) (1.40)
(2.9) OCR 0.67** 0.70*** 0.73*** -2.97*** -0.66*** -0.39 5.57*** 0.97 - +++
(0.30) (0.19) (0.04) (0.55) (0.33) (0.32) (0.92)
(2.10) OCR 0.94 0.52** 0.88*** -4.85*** -1.19* 0.71** 6.46*** 0.98 - ++
(0.67) (0.22) (0.04) (1.15) (0.71) (0.32) (2.01)
(2.11) OCR 2.16*** 3.33*** 0.49*** -2.90*** -2.35*** -1.24 5.18*** 0.98 + +++
(0.60) (0.74) (0.04) (0.57) (0.61) (0.85) (0.97)
(2.12) OCR 3.30*** 3.08 0.79*** -2.87*** -3.84*** 0.05 5.23*** 0.98 ++ -
(1.15) (2.00) (0.04) (0.69) (1.21) (2.07) (1.03)
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The regression estimations below correspond to t+h=0=1=2 (forecast) data of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, published in their historical transcripts and follow equations 
(27), (28) and (29), respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level for all parameters > 0. +++, ++ and + indicate significance at the 99%, 
95% and 90% level for the strict abidance of βπ (t+h) > 1 (Taylor Principle) and βγ (t+h) > 0. 
 
Table 9: Various Taylor-type Rules based on (forecast) data of the U.S. Fed















βγ  HP Filter
Output
Gap (t+1):
βγ  HP Filter
Output
Gap (t+2):








Gap Policy  
(Post Crisis)
Δ Output Gap 
Policy (Post 
Crisis)
Constant R2 βπ (t+h) > 1 βγ(t+h) > 0
Fund Rate 2.27*** -0.05 2.13*** 0.55 +++ -
(0.23) (0.07) (0.19)
Fund Rate 2.29*** -0.13 2.06*** 0.57 +++ -
(0.22) (0.08) (0.17)
Fund Rate 3.01*** -0.45*** 1.90*** 0.77 +++ -
(0.18) (0.16) (0.12)
Fund Rate n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fund Rate 0.83 0.73*** 0.91*** -2.67* 2.00 0.97 - +++
(0.93) (0.20) (0.03) (1.38) (1.41)
Fund Rate 0.85 0.84*** 0.91*** -3.35*** 3.28** 0.97 - +++
(0.98) (0.24) (0.03) (1.43) (1.39)
Fund Rate 2.47*** -0.32 0.84*** -1.43* 2.38*** 0.97 + -
(0.85) (0.38) (0.04) (0.86) (0.78)
Fund Rate n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fund Rate 2.90** 0.52** 0.89*** -2.06* -3.31** 0.18 1.16 0.98 - ++
(1.20) (0.23) (0.03) (1.18) (1.36) (0.32) (1.16)
Fund Rate 3.24*** 0.75*** 0.89*** -2.18** -3.75*** -0.06 1.84* 0.98 + +++
(1.17) (0.26) (0.03) (1.09) (1.35) (0.35) (1.07)
Fund Rate 3.46*** -0.81 0.83*** -1.42* -2.78** 1.13 1.75** 0.97 ++ -
(1.05) (0.56) (0.04) (0.81) (1.24) (0.73) (0.76)
Fund Rate n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.




After evaluating the estimated Taylor-type Rule specifications in table 7, 8 and 9 in 
more detail, six important findings stand out in particular and are of utmost interest for both, 
practitioners and researchers, active in the field of monetary policies.  
 
1. Firstly, the inflation coefficients (𝛽𝜋 (𝑡+ℎ)) are positive in all cases except for the 
classical, unadjusted 2-year forecast Taylor Rule variant for the Swedish Riksbank 
(-2.44 percentage points), which can partly be attributed to disturbances related to the 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, most of the coefficients 
are reasonable in size, not different from unity, and mostly significantly different from 
zero. These results indicate that inflation deviations from target are indeed an 
important variable for explaining monetary policy behavior across all different policy 
jurisdictions and provide first evidence for a general monetary policy behavior 
consistent with the Taylor Principle.  
When analyzing the classic Taylor Rule, based on realized and forecasted data 
in a first step, compelling evidence for monetary policy behavior highly consistent 
with the Taylor Principle can be found for both New Zealand and the U.S (estimation 
2.3, 2.4, 3.3 and 3.4). The corresponding observations hold for both central banks at 
the 99% significance level. Contrarily, the inflation coefficient seems to be not in line 
with the Taylor Principle for Sweden if not accounted for a structural break in real 
interest equilibrium rates. However, when analyzing monetary policy behavior more 
deeply, it becomes obvious that an important distinction between monetary policy 
behavior pre- and post-financial crisis needs to be made. 
More precisely, all estimations provide strong evidence that the ex ante 
inflation targeting central banks’ forecasts under analysis are consistent with the 
Taylor Principle for the t+1 year forecast horizon, prior to the financial crisis 
2007/2008. The results hold at the 99% significance level for Sweden, at the 95% 
significance level for the U.S. and at the 90% significance level for New Zealand. 
Moreover, the coefficient of New Zealand for the t+2 years forecasts horizons prior to 
the financial crisis seem to follow the Taylor Principle even more strictly. Monetary 
policy behavior for the t+2 year forecast horizon can be confirmed at the 95% 
significance level.. Moreover, the coefficient of the Swedish Riksbank for the t+2 
year forecast horizon is not statistically different from unity. 
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 In detail, central bank forecasts are highly consistent with the Taylor Principle 
in the case of the 1-year forecast of the Swedish Riksbank adjusted for a change in 
real interest rate equilibria- and/or a change in policy behavior post-crisis (estimation 
1.7 and 1.11). In the case of New Zealand, the results indicate a clear obedience to the 
Taylor Principle for the classic Taylor Rules and for the Taylor Rule morphologies 
adjusted for changing policy behavior post-crisis (estimation 2.3, 2.4, 2.11 and 2.12). 
Lastly, estimations based on published forecast data of the U.S. seem to provide the 
strongest indications for constituent policy behavior with regards to the Taylor 
Principle. The Taylor Principle holds in all forecast cases for the U.S. and turns only 
insignificant when incorporating the possibility of a changing real interest equilibrium 
rate post-financial crisis, for the realized cases t+0. Nevertheless, the two parameters 
are not different from unity in these cases. 
Post-financial crisis, the inflation parameters of New Zealand and the U.S. turn 
insignificant based on joint hypothesis tests of the respective inflation coefficients and 
the changing inflation policy coefficient, however stay significant for Sweden for the 
1-year forecast horizon. This result statistically holds for all estimation for the U.S. 
and New Zealand based on forecast data, suggesting that the corresponding central 
banks do not necessarily adjust their interest rate policy instrument by more than one 
to one to changes in inflation forecasts after the financial crisis and, hence, might not 
hold on to the Taylor Principle in more recent times.  
 Intuitively, the empirical findings are reasonable and partly confirm the until 
recently believed, notable asymmetry in monetary policy implementations. In 
excessive expansion periods when inflation could potentially rise to undesirable 
levels, monetary authorities could increase their respective policy rate to any given 
level, which they deem to be necessary. In contrast, in periods marked as recessions, 
the policy rate adjustments were believed to be limited by the zero lower bound. As 
soon as the zero lower bound was reached, the short-term interest rate instrument 
potentially loses its power and cannot be further tuned down. In this case, economic 
stimulus needs to be provided by more unconventional, complementary monetary 
policies, for instance, QE and credit easing (CE). However, recently different central 
banks experiment with negative policy rates, for instance the Swedish Riksbank, as 
even large scale QE and CE programs seem not to provide sufficient expansionary 
stimulus in some economies. 
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Applying the aforementioned reasoning on the sample under analysis sheds 
some light on the empirical finding. Prior to the devastating financial crisis in 
2007/2008, central banks primary monetary policy instrument, used for price- and 
output stabilization, were short-term discount interest rates (at least during the time 
span under analysis). The policy rates were sufficiently adjusted in accordance with 
the Taylor Principle and provided economic stability. However, as a direct response to 
the crisis, most central banks excessively cut their policy rates to, or close to the zero 
lower bound to stimulate the economy, thereby effectively reaching the limit of their 
policy instrument. For example, the U.S. federal fund rate nearly reached the zero 
interest floor in Q4/2008, where it stayed for almost seven years. Since 2008, further 
expansionary economic stimulus was provided by various large scale QE programs.218 
Even though the OCR did not effectively reach the zero lower bound in the case of 
New Zealand, a historical high cut could be observed. After the historical cut in OCR, 
the interest rate was left unchanged for almost five years. Sweden appeared to be the 
exception. The policy rate only shortly approached the zero interest rate floor before 
an increase was observed again. However, as a consequences of the European 
sovereign debt crisis the Swedish Riksbank lowered their policy rate once again. A 
remarkable observation is provided by the fact that the Swedish Riksbank recently 
crossed the zero lower bound and set negative short-term policy rates, complementary 
to large scale asset purchase programs. A potential reason why no statistically 
significant change in policy behavior could be observed in Sweden could be attributed 
to the fact that Sweden appears to not obey to the previously believed limitations of 
the zero lower bound on interest rates and further adjusted its policy rate instrument.  
As observations for crossing the zero lower bound are momentarily rather 
limited, it represents a field of enormous interest for potential future research.  
 
2. The output gap indicator is, as aforesaid, a measure of how far the economy is away 
from its potential productivity level and an important determination of potential 
inflation development. As previously stated, most economic models require the output 
gap parameter to be ≥ 0 for stabilizing monetary policy decisions. 
                                                 
218 Fed (2013) - https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-were-the-federal-reserves-large-scale-asset-
purchases.htm (accessed 29/10/2017) 
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For most specifications, the output gap parameter appears to be of reasonable 
magnitude and is either positive or not significantly different from zero. This first 
observation indicates that all central banks place some weight on output stabilization, 
or at the very least do not follow a potentially destabilizing monetary policy.  
Especially noteworthy is the fact that the parameters are highly significant and 
are of relatively high magnitude for all estimation specifications in New Zealand, 
after incorporating the possibility of a changing real interest rate equilibrium 
(estimation 2.5 to 2.8) and changing policy behavior post-crisis (estimation 2.9 to 
2.12), with the exception of the t+2 year forecasts estimation (regression 2.12). The 
statistical insignificance in this case mainly stems from the high, inherit forecast error. 
Furthermore, according to the estimation results for the Riksbank, monetary 
authorities in the Swedish jurisdiction seem to put some weight on output stabilization 
for the t+1 year forecast horizon, after adjusting the regressions for possible changing 
policy behavior and a change in real interest equilibrium rates post-crisis (estimations 
1.5 to 1.12).  
The observation of a positive output gap parameter confirms the flexible 
inflation targeting strategy of both central banks. As elaborated in section 2.4.1., the 
objectives of inflation targeting central banks can be well approximated by a standard 
quadratic intertemporal loss function, consisting of the sum of the expected, squared 
inflation gap and a relative weight times the expected squared output gap as the 
intermediate target variables (equation 18). In order to minimize the expected loss 
function some weight must be placed on the output gap next to the inflation gap under 
flexible inflation targeting.  
Contrarily, the forward-looking variant estimations for the U.S. seem to not 
incorporate a high degree of output stabilization, as the coefficients appear to be all 
negative in size, not statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, post financial crisis 
a possible shift towards a forward-looking monetary policy that places more weight 
on output stabilization could potentially be the case. This hypothesis is partly 
supported by a large positive parameter for a change in output stabilization post-crisis 
(estimation 3.11) The statistical insignificance of the corresponding parameter stems 
mainly from the large, inherit standard error. Moreover, the realized output gap 
parameters at t+0 turn positive and significant at the 99% and 95% level after 
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incorporating the possibility of changing policy behavior and changing real interest 
equilibrium rates. 
 The results are highly interesting and partly confirm the past policy objective 
of the Fed. Prior to 2008, the Fed followed a price stability strategy and has been 
reluctant to explicitly acknowledge full employment as a separate policy goal. The 
Fed rather communicated that the state of full employment could best be reached by 
following a price stability strategy. The corresponding results, which indicate a high, 
significant inflation gap coefficient, strongly support the communicated statements. 
However, as of December 2012, the Fed’s FOMC announced the new policy 
directive, namely its dual objective of price stability and full employment. 
Furthermore, equivalent language indications for the followed operational dual 
objective were identifiable since the FOMC´s monetary policy report in September 
2010.219 An official shift towards a monetary policy which focusses on output 
stabilization next to price stability could grant some explanation for the high change 
in output gap parameter post-crisis. Moreover, the immanent high standard error 
could stem from the low variations in policy rates, once it hit the zero lower bound. 
The question, whether a shift in monetary policy from a price stability strategy 
towards a real dual objective is incorporated in the ex ante U.S. central bank forecasts 
could be the ground for further research once the policy rate reaches levels in excess 
of the zero interest rate floor and provides more variation for efficient statistical 
interferences. 
 
3. Furthermore, as mentioned before, the results in table 7, 8 and 9 grant strong evidence 
for a change in policy behavior post-financial crisis 2007/2008 for the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand and the U.S. Fed with regards to price stability. The estimated results 
indicate a large negative adjustment towards their general price stabilization policies 
in all specifications and are highly significant, mostly at the 1% significance level. 
The dynamic policy adjustment parameters range from -0.66 (estimation 2.9) to -3.84 
(estimation 2.12) for New Zealand and from -2.78 (estimation 3.11) to -3.75 
(estimation 3.9) for the U.S. Surprisingly, no change in price stabilization policy 
behavior is observed in the estimation results of the Swedish Riksbank. 
                                                 
219 Thornton (2012). p. 117 
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As previously explained, this phenomenon could partly be attributed to the fact 
that the U.S. Fed reached the zero lower bound post-financial crisis, limiting the 
further adjustment potential of its interest rate policy instrument. Instead, the Fed had 
to rely on more unconventional monetary policy instruments, such as QE and CE. In 
the case of New Zealand, no sufficient variation in the policy rate could be observed 
after a dramatic cut post-crisis. The Swedish Riksbank only shortly hit the zero lower 
bound on their policy rate post-financial crisis. A fast recovery could be observed 
before the policy rate dropped once again due to the European sovereign debt crisis. 
As no sufficient expansionary stimulus, even after engaging into large scale QE 
programs, could be provided, the Riksbank decided to temporary cross the zero lower 
bound. This decision could potentially be an indicator, why the Riksbank policy 
adjustments appeared to still be in line with the Taylor Principle, even after 
accounting for the financial and European sovereign debt crisis.  
With regards to output stabilization, no statistically significant change in the 
output gap coefficient could be observed in any policy jurisdiction with regards to 
their interest rate policy instrument. Nevertheless, the change in output gap policy 
parameter after the financial crisis appears to be of relatively high magnitude in the 
t+1 forecast estimation of the Riksbank and of the Fed, indicating that both central 
banks placed some more weight on stabilizing output. The statistical insignificance 
effectively stems from the immanent high standard errors. 
However, the presented results post-financial crisis have to be treated with 
cautions, as variations in the policy rates are rather limited for the case of the U.S. and 
New Zealand. Moreover, the presented results are solely concerned with interest rate 
instruments and do not take other policy instruments into account. As aforesaid, a 
higher emphasis on output stabilization does not seem to be unlikely for the U.S., 
especially after the official announcement of following a dual objective in 2012. On a 
more general level, a high degree of output stabilization would seem reasonable, 
especially in times of severe crisis.  
 
4. All short-term policy rates are highly dominated by the previous level of interest rates. 
This is clearly indicated by the excessive smoothing parameters, ranging from 0.85 
(regression 1.5 and 1.9) to 0.93 (regression 1.11) for Sweden, 0.73 (regression 2.9) to 
0.88 (regression 2.10) for New Zealand and 0.83 (regression 3.11) to 0.91 (regression 
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3.5 and 3.6) for the U.S. Even though all smoothing parameters are statistically 
different from unity, they are very close to it.  
The observed phenomenon of a high smoothing parameter could be seen as an 
indication for the fact that central banks are normally not be concerned with relative, 
temporary variations in inflation and output levels, but rather focus on so-called pure 
inflation, the sustained devaluation of money and its effect on the economy. Thus, 
variations to the interest rate instrument should only be conducted for non-temporary, 
larger deviations of inflation from the desired target level, not explicitly accounted for 
in the provided estimations. Moreover, as elaborated in section 2.3.1., central banks 
generally try to minimize the variability in policy rate changes, as frequent changes in 
the interest rate could significantly harm the credibility and accountability of central 
banks’ initial policy announcements and could introduce unnecessary volatility into 
the economy. Lastly, for a long time horizon it was believed that the zero nominal 
interest rate floor effectively provides a limit of how much policy rates can be cut. 
This implies that further reductions of the policy rate in response to deflationary 
shocks cannot be absorbed by changes in policy rates. The policy rates effectively 
stay at the zero lower bound while other complementary actions have to be decided 
on. Consequently, the policy rates seem to immolate a significant smoothing 
character, while in reality they simply reached their adjustment potential.  
 
5. The constants, which are proxies for the long- to medium-term real interest rate 
equilibria are nearly all highly, statistically significant at the 1% level as well as are 
reasonable in magnitude, with the exception of regression 3.5 and 3.9 conducted for 
the U.S. This, however, is mainly attributed to the large standard errors. Moreover, 
according to the regression estimations, New Zealand comprises the highest 
equilibrium real interest rates corresponding to values between 3.69 (regression 2.4) 
and 6.51 (regression 2.7). Contrarily, the U.S. comprises the lowest proxies for the 
long- to medium-term real interest equilibrium rates, ranging from 1.75 (estimation 
3.11) to 3.28 (estimation 3.7). Lastly, the rates vary between 2.43 (regression 1.3) and 
4.28 (equation 1.11) for Sweden. Moreover, estimations that have a constant with a 
higher magnitude contain noticeably higher standard errors.  
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6. The financial crisis time break dummy is, as expected, negative for all specifications 
and countries. Hence, all estimations provide a clear indication towards a structural 
break in real interest equilibrium rates post-crisis. The corresponding dummy 
variables are highly significant at the 1% level for almost every case and range from 
as little as -1.42 in regression 7.11 for the U.S to as much as -5.10 in estimation 6.6 
for New Zealand. Thus, the presented results confirm the assumption of the structural 
break initially proposed in section 3.3.1. 
 
Overall, the indicative results present various significant findings in the area of 
monetary policy research. Even though, short explanations for the respective findings are 
presented, each of them deserves further deep, individual research and lay the ground for 
avenues for further research. 
 
3.4.   Limitations, Assumptions and Avenues for Future Research 
The following part is dedicated to a summary of limitations of the presented findings 
and suggest intriguing areas for further avenues for future research. 
The empirical analysis provides first evidence of generally consistent ex ante central 
banks’ forecasts with respect to the well-known Taylor Principle. However, it depends on a 
wide range of assumptions. In particular, the used proxies for the inflation and output gap 
could be subject to further analysis. For instance, the forecasted output gap is solely 
calculated by a HP filter approach with a quarterly smoothing term. However, most 
international monetary bodies rely on much more sophisticated structural methods. Thus, 
potential deviations between estimated output gaps used in the respective empirical analysis 
and estimated output gaps used by the decision-making bodies of central banks might be 
possible. Moreover, the inflation measurement component is a fundamental variable in the 
conduction of monetary policy and its evaluation. CPI was chosen as a proxy in the 
quantitative analysis due to the provided ex ante forecasts by inflation targeting central 
banks’. However, as monetary policy should mainly be concerned with pure inflation and not 
with relative, temporary price fluctuation, a more appropriate inflation policy measure for the 
inflation gap would be based on CPI less energy. A possible robustness check, of using other 
inflation and output gap indicators is intriguing and worth further exploring. 
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Furthermore, as the sample is fairly limited and comprises only a small number of 
inflation targeting central banks, no generalization should be made. It would be worth further 
exploring, whether the empirical results also hold for a larger sample of central banks. 
Moreover, the sample under analysis might incorporate some selection bias. All evaluated 
central banks are active in developed economies. Thus. the important question arises, whether 
a difference in policy behavior in emerging and developed policy jurisdictions can be 
observed. 
Moreover, the presented empirical findings are all based on linear Taylor-type Rules, 
with the incorporated possibility of a structural change in the monetary policy behavior post 
financial crisis. However, various studies discovered evidence for nonlinear augmented 
Taylor-type Rules. For instance, Castro reported strong evidence for nonlinear augmented 
policy behavior for the ECB and the Bank of England.220 Rabanal presented empirical 
findings, which support dynamic shifts in Taylor-type Rule coefficients in the U.S. for 
economic expansion and recession cycles, even when accounted for different chairman 
preferences.221 Furthermore, Kato und Nishiyama reported a more forceful monetary policy 
reaction in vicinity of the zero lower bound, indicating asymmetric, accelerated policy 
responses dependent on the state of the economy.222 Lastly, Cukierman and Muscatelli 
validated non-linear Taylor-type Rules in the U.K. and U.S. They attributed the non-linearity 
to different business cycles as well as to the policy approach followed by different chairmen. 
In particular, they emphasized that inflation targeting policy regimes seem to have a convex 
Taylor rule reaction function whereas non-inflation targeting policy regimes tend to have a 
concave reaction function.223 As the initial empirical study of this thesis did not account for 
any of these reported phenomena, it would be of utmost interest to analyze whether inflation 
targeting central banks’ forecast incorporate any of the previous reported findings.  
Lastly, with the emergence of negative nominal interest rates in a variety of policy 
jurisdiction, a new research area arises, namely the conduction of monetary policy under 
negative nominal interest rates. However, as experiences of operating with policy rates under 
the zero lower bound are fairly limited so far, a detailed analysis is left for future research. 
 
 
                                                 
220 Castro (2010). p. 1 
221 Rabanal (2004). p. 16 
222 Kato and Nishiyama (2005). p. 118 
223 Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008). p. 3-21 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
The presented paper has examined the important question whether ex ante inflation 
targeting central banks’ forecasts are internally consistent with the Taylor Principle, by 
empirically comparing quarterly published economic forecasts of selected central banks, 
namely the Swedish Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the U.S. Fed to their 
respective policy rate developments. The debates discussed in this thesis range from 
theoretical models to practical policy implementations, which are fairly complex and partly 
controversial. Thus, a broad overview of important macroeconomic debates, ranging from 
monetary policy transmission channels and instrument problems to the well know Taylor-
Rule and its morphologies up until recent discussions about policymaking under inflation 
targeting, has been provided.  
 Generally, the provided empirical results are reasonable in magnitude and seem to 
explain monetary policy behavior remarkably well. In detail, the elaborated quantitative 
findings indicate a strong consistency with the Taylor Principle before the financial crisis for 
the t+1 year forecast horizon for all central banks under analysis and for the t+2 years 
forecast horizon for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Furthermore, the t+2 years ex ante 
forecast for the Swedish Riksbank appears to be not different from unity. After the financial 
crisis, the corresponding ex ante central banks’ forecasts seem to not comply with the Taylor 
Principle anymore, with the exception of the monetary policy forecasts of the Swedish 
Riksbank. This observation indicates a significant shift in policy behavior of the U.S. Fed and 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which is statistically confirmed by the dynamic policy 
coefficients, mostly at the 1% significance level. For the U.S., this observed shift in policy 
was partly attributed to the vicinity of the zero lower bound, which limited the further use of 
the policy instrument as well as to the observable occurrence of excessive, unconventional 
monetary policy actions, such as the QE programs, started in 2008. The Swedish Riksbank 
crossed the zero lower bound on interest rates in 2015. Eliminating the previous believed 
limits on how far interest rates can be reduced, the Swedish Riksbank ex ante forecasts seem 
to comply with the Taylor Principle even post-financial and European sovereign debt crisis. 
 Along with the elaborated findings of a general consistency with the Taylor Principle 
pre- financial crisis and a change in monetary policy behavior post-financial crisis, several 
more findings have been presented. Firstly, several studies so far have assumed a constant 
long-run equilibrium real interest rate. However, the quantitative findings indicate a sharp 
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decline in real interest equilibrium rates post-financial crisis. Thus, using the same constant 
real equilibrium rate before and after the financial crisis would result in misleading findings. 
Future studies should at least analyze the existence of a structural break in long-run real 
equilibrium rates. Furthermore, only limited output stabilization behavior could be observed 
in the ex ante forecast estimations for New Zealand and Sweden and no direct, statistically 
significant output stabilization behavior could be observed in the forecast estimation for the 
U.S. However, this empirical finding can largely be attributed to large imminent standard 
errors. Moreover, the results partly indicate a higher but not statistically significant focus on 
output stabilization post-financial crisis for the U.S. The observed phenomenon is 
economically reasonable as the U.S. Fed is officially conducting monetary policy under a 
dual objective since 2012. Finally, all estimations of the smoothing parameter seem to be 
extremely high, indicating a significant policy rate inertia, which has also been extensively 
reported in past literature. 
In conclusion, the primary objective of granting sufficient evidence for all central 
banks under analysis that ex ante central banks’ inflation targeting forecasts, indeed, are 
consistent with the ubiquitous Taylor Principle, is accomplished, prior to the financial crisis. 
The immersion of the financial crisis, on the other hand, has shown that even monetary policy 
rule relationships and economic assumptions which were taken for granted alter dramatically, 
in times of severe economic crisis when nominal interest rates approach the zero-lower 
bound.  
Finally, with the occurrence of negative nominal interest rates in a variety of policy 
jurisdictions, the Taylor Principle might be complied with again even with policy rates at or 








IV.I.   The Various Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission 
As previously argued, in conventional times, most modern monetary authorities 
typically implement monetary policies by directly setting the interest rate on central bank 
reserves, thereby implicitly treating money as an endogenous variable. The monetary policy 
objective is then transmitted into the real economy.224 As economic interactions within an 
open economy are fairly complex, monetary policy actions affect real economic variables 
through various intermediate channels and are typically characterized by long, variable and 
uncertain time lags. In the context of neoclassical channels, monetary policy decisions are 
transmitted by affecting investment, consumption and international trade.225 Non-neoclassical 
transmission channels primarily arise due to private market imperfections or government 
interferences in credit markets.226  
According to the traditional Keynesian perspective, a contractionary monetary policy 
(𝑀 ↓) induced increase in short-term nominal interest rates (𝑖 ↑) would lead to a decrease in 
aggregate demand and total output ((𝑌 ↓) by increasing financing costs. As a result, total 
investment spending (𝐼 ↓) of both firms and private households would be lowered.227  
 
𝑀 ↓ (↑)  → 𝑖 ↑ (↓) → 𝐼 ↓ (↑) → 𝑌 ↓ (↑)        (4) 
 
Unanticipated shocks in interest rates, however, do not only have a short-term effect 
on real economic variables, due to the rigidity of the wage-price system, but also can affect 
long-term interest rates by forming expectations about future interest rate changes 
incorporated in the yield curve. According to the basic rational expectations theory of the 
term structure, the implied forward interest rates incorporated in the yield curve are equal to 
the corresponding anticipated spot rates. Deviations from the rational expectation theory 
result mainly from the liquidity preference of market participants who will require a risk 
premium for longer-term financial assets. Hence, by affecting expectations about the future, 
                                                 
224 Arestis and Sawyer (2003), p. 2 
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unanticipated policy actions can ultimately affect the real interest rate over the time horizon 
in which expectations are adjusted.228  
Indeed, standard neoclassical economic models of investment indicate that the classic 
user cost of capital plays a central role for the demand for capital and is a key determinant for 
the consumption of investment goods, residential housing and consumer durables.229 The user 
cost of capital adjusted by the marginal tax rate (𝑢𝑐) can be written as: 
 
𝑢𝑐 = 𝑝𝑐 [(1 − 𝜋) ∗ (𝑖 − 𝜋
∗) − (𝜏𝑐
∗ − 𝜋∗)]       (5) 
 
where   
𝑝𝑐 is the relative price of new capital, 
i is the nominal interest rate, 
𝜋∗ is the expected inflation rate, 
𝜏𝑐
∗ is the real rate of capital appreciation..230 
 
Normally, both firms and private households base their investment decision on long-
term interest rates rather than short-term nominal ones. However, dynamic-stochastic-general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models link investments to a sequence of expected short-term interest 
rates by incorporating a dynamic intertemporal optimality condition. Thus, DSGE models 
provide a link between short- and long-term interest rate based on some variation of the 
expectation hypothesis of the term structure.231 
Another theory supporting the investment transmission channel, which can also be 
linked to the user cost of capital approach, is Tobin’s q theory. Tobin’s q is defined as the 
market value of a firm divided by the current replacement costs of its assets. Put simply, a 
high Tobin’s q indicates that current replacement costs of the assets held by the firm are 
relatively low in comparison to the market value of the firm, making it attractive to raise 
capital by issuing shares to finance additional investments.232 Ceteris paribus, when 
monetary authorities lower interest rates, bonds become less attractive relative to stocks, 
which results in an increase in demand for stocks. Due to the resulting increase in stock 
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231 Boivin Kiley and Mishkin (2010), p. 9  
232 Mishkin (2001), p. 2 - For a formal derivation how Tobin`s q can be exactly related to the user cost of 
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prices, Tobin’s q increases and firms are able to raise capital for investments with fewer 
shares required to be issued. This in turn can increase the number of profitable investment 
projects companies pursue and stimulate total aggregated output through a higher amount of 
investments.233 
Meanwhile, the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption defines wealth and income as key 
determinants of consumer spending and therefore identifies another transmission channel. 
Ceteris paribus, if stock prices rise after a loosening monetary policy, private households’ 
total wealth increases. An increase in wealth of households will then affect consumer 
spending and stimulate total output.234  
In open economies with flexible exchange rates, policy induced changes in short-term 
nominal interest rate additionally affect real economic variables through the exchange rate 
channel, due to the effects of interest parity in combination with price rigidity. If the domestic 
nominal interest rate increases above the level of its foreign counterpart, domestic monetary 
deposits become more valuable relative to other currency deposits, which leads to an increase 
in demand and to a corresponding currency appreciation under the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility.235 Simultaneously, as prices are assumed to be sticky, a change in nominal 
interest rate affects real exchange rates in the short run and impacts export and import 
behaviors of an economy. Therefore, an increase in the interest rate would ultimately result in 
a temporary decrease in net exports and lower total output, until the return of the exchange 
rate to its previous real base line path.236 
In addition to traditional neoclassical transmission channels, the credit channel theory 
indicates that the effect of monetary policies on interest rates is amplified by endogenous 
variations in the external finance premium, which can be described as the difference between 
external and internal financing options. The linkage, between the external financing option 
and the monetary policy action that impacts loan demand and supply, is primarily described 
by the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel.237 
The theoretical prediction that a borrower’s finance premium depends on its financial 
position gives rise to the balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission. Ceteris 
paribus, a stronger net wealth position should result in more attractive credit terms. As 
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monetary policy induced changes in nominal interest rates not only impact the market interest 
rate but also affect the net financial position of firms, in both a direct and indirect way, 
additional monetary transmission channels have been identified.238 For instance, a tightening 
monetary policy and a corresponding increase in interest rates directly affect the balance 
sheet of the borrowers due to increasing interest expenses resulting from outstanding short-
term or floating-rate debt instruments. This in turn leads to a reduction of net cash flow and 
weakens the financial positions of the borrower. Furthermore, as previously explained, a 
tightening monetary policy is associated with a decline in asset prices and therefore reduces 
the net value of borrowers’ collateral as well as their corresponding creditworthiness. This, 
among others, gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Consequently, a 
tightening monetary policy amplifies the increase in total funding costs of firms above the 
level explainable by the changes in market interest rates and, therefore, further lowers their 
total loan demand for investments.239 Moreover, tightening monetary policy might also affect 
firms indirectly through reduced spending of their downstream customers, causing further 
declines in revenues.240  
A contractionary monetary policy might also negatively affect the loan supply of 
banks and impact the corresponding bank-dependent borrowers by decreasing the core 
deposit funding of bank loans. This mechanism is known as the bank lending channel.241  
A further implication of the credit channels is that a decrease in total loan supply will impose 
a larger effect on smaller firms, as they are highly dependent on the supply of bank loans due 
to their inability of raising capital through debt or equity capital markets.242 
To conclude, a policy induced, unexpected change in short-term interest rates does not 
only impact investments and total output through traditional neoclassic transmission 
channels, but also affects firms’ investment behavior through non-neoclassical credit 
channels, which amplify the magnitude of monetary policy effects. The impact of non-
neoclassical transmission channels, however, seems to asymmetrically influence the 
investment behavior of firms, depending on their size.243 Moreover, as the exact magnitude 
and time effect of monetary policy effects are uncertain, it is hardly possible to predict the 
precise effect of any transmission channel on the economy and general price levels.  
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IV.II.   Empirical Analysis – Realized Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
      
Table 10: CPI correlation matrix Table 11: GDP correlation matrix 
      
Figure 4: CPI development in Sweden, New Zealand and the U.S. 
 
Figure 5: GDP development in Sweden, New Zealand and the U.S. 
CPI GDP Growth
Correlation Matrix Sweden New Zealand United States
Sweden 1,00
New Zealand 0,62 1,00
United States 0,17 0,22 1,00
GDP Growth
Correlation Matrix Sweden New Zealand United States
Sweden 1,00
New Zealand 0,26 1,00
United States 0,24 0,41 1,00
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IV.III.   Empirical Analysis – Potential Output Forecasts 244   
      
Figure 6: Potential output estimate t+1 (Sweden) Figure 7: Potential output estimate t+2 (Sweden) 
     
Figure 8: Potential output estimate t+1 (New Zealand) Figure 9: Potential output estimate t+2 (New Zealand) 
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IV.IV.   Empirical Analysis – Comparison of Realized and Forecasted CPI 
      
Figure 11: Comparison of realized and forecasted CPI (Sweden) Figure 12: Comparison of realized and forecasted CPI (New Zealand) 
 
Figure 13: Comparison of realized and forecasted CPI (U.S.)  
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IV.V.   Empirical Analysis – Comparison of Realized and Forecasted GDP Growth 
      
Figure 14: Comparison of realized and forecasted GDP growth (Sweden) Figure 15: Comparison of realized and forecasted GDP growth (New Zealand) 
 
Figure 16: Comparison realized and forecasted GDP growth (U.S.) 
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IV.VI.   Empirical Analysis – T.R. (Taylor’s Suggested and Estimated Parameters) 245 
 
      
Figure 17: Classic Taylor Rule (Sweden) Figure 18: Estimated Taylor Rule (Sweden) 
 
      
Figure 19: Classic Taylor Rule based on forecast data (Sweden) Figure 20: Estimated Taylor Rule based on forecast data (Sweden) 
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Figure 21: Classic Taylor Rule (New Zealand) Figure 22: Estimated Taylor Rule (New Zealand) 
 
      
Figure 23: Classic Taylor Rule based on forecast data (New Zealand) Figure 24: Estimated Taylor Rule based on forecast data (New Zealand) 





      
Figure 25: Classic Taylor Rule (U.S.) Figure 26: Estimated Taylor Rule (U.S.) 
 
      
Figure 27: Classic Taylor Rule based on forecast data (U.S.) Figure 28: Estimated Taylor Rule based on forecast data (U.S.) 
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IV.VII.   Empirical Analysis – T.R. inclusive Interest Rate Smoothing and Time Break 246 
 
      
Figure 29: T.R. incl. interest rate smoothing and time break (Sweden) Figure 30: T.R. incl. interest rate smoothing and time break based on forecast data 
(Sweden) 
 
      
Figure 31: T.R. incl. interest rate smoothing and time break (New Zealand) Figure 32: T.R. incl. interest rate smoothing and time break based on forecast data 
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IV.VIII.   Empirical Analysis – T.R. inclusive Dynamic Policy Behavior 247 
 
      
Figure 35: T.R. incl. dynamic policy behavior (Sweden) Figure 36: T.R. incl. dynamic policy behavior based on forecast data (Sweden.) 
      
Figure 37: T.R. incl. dynamic policy behavior (New Zealand) Figure 38: T.R. incl. dynamic policy behavior based on forecast data (New 
Zealand) 
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